

April 1951

50c

COMBAT FORCES

Infantry Journal • Field Artillery Journal

TACTICAL AIR
CONTROL IN KOREA

MORE RIFLE FIRE

FORWARD OBSERVER
IN KOREA

WAR WILL BE MODERN WHEN . . .

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg



There is no more mud . . .



or the Air Force controls the weather




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or the infantryman is



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Faith Rebuilt

To the Editors:

I have just completed my first year's subscription to the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*, and I would like to take this opportunity to stop and make a few observations of just what it has grown to mean to me—a civilian—during this time, and how I have personally benefited by subscribing to it. I did, I must now admit, first subscribe to it only to get someone off my neck regarding the subscription.

First of all, *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* has been solely responsible for rebuilding my faith in our army officers as gentlemen and intelligent leaders. You no doubt remember the wave of abuse directed against American military leaders following the last war, which pictured the army officer as a brutal, stupid, and greedy wretch, unfit to be trusted even around anyone's dog, let alone entrusted with the destiny of so many of this nation's young men.

I must admit that I for one came to believe this fully, and have mainly dreaded the draft because of the consequences of falling under their influence—a natural dread when you consider just how the army officer has so often been painted.

However, that is all changed for me now, entirely due to the contents of *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*. In reading the many fine articles, I finally came to realize that our military leaders are indeed well educated and trained; that they can be entrusted with our nation's safety, and expected to treat the lowest man fairly and impartially.

The second important benefit I have received from the *JOURNAL* is a greater amount of mental stability and peace of mind in this mad world. Ever since I have been a little boy, it seems as if I have heard of nothing but war and crisis to the point where worry over the future allowed me no peace. Looking back upon it now, I realize that this was not so much the fault of momentous events as the confusion and contradiction in our press reports which are far from building stability in our civilian population—which has already shown some signs of cracking up, although, as the *JOURNAL* points out, it has not yet begun to fight.

To me *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* has provided the means of obtaining a much clearer insight into the actual situation. And this, in turn, has brought to me a rebirth of faith in the future of our nation and our fortunes abroad. For the

first time in years I can view the situation calmly with some peace of mind.

Finally, *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* has taught me that the Infantry is, after all, something to be proud of. We, as a nation, are beginning to lose sight of this fact in a time of air and naval glory. In the final analysis the lack of naval and air support for the North Korean and Chinese infantry has proven, all too conclusively, that a conflict can never be brought to a conclusion until one of the combatants' last infantrymen is sent to his maker.

NILES T. LOPEZ

6512 Victoria Ave.

Los Angeles 43, Calif.

• This is one of the warmest letters we have ever received—a highly intelligent comment from a regular civilian member-reader. The officer corps of the Army is not perfect, any more than the corps of leaders in industry, business, labor or elsewhere in the civilian world. But on the whole, the Army officer is a man trying his best to measure up to his often difficult responsibilities—and a man who deserves praise for the way he tackles his job, far more often than censure. We hope still other civilian readers will gain similar understanding, and comfort from our pages.

Training for Correspondents

To the Editors:

Enclosed is my order blank for a year's subscription to *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*. Your January 1951 issue was the first I've seen and, as an old *Infantry Journal* fan, may I compliment you on a splendid, accurate publication.

I was particularly interested in the short piece by Lieutenant Wells entitled, "What Can You Believe?" Like most old Regulars, I'm continually running around in a slow burn due to the sloppy, goozly newspaper work coming out of Korea. It appears at times that the Army is merely an excellent vehicle with which to knife the present Administration.

I don't fully agree with the suggestion that the Army adopt the Marine Corps technique of combat correspondents—nothing more than regimental press agents in my book. I would like to suggest, and I believe the freedom-of-the-press professionals would go for it too, the following:

All newspapermen, except those who have seen front-line duty with the Army or Marine Corps, should be required to go through the Infantry School at Ben-

ning—taking it easy, of course, on the physical end of it. After completion of the School, they could then be accredited overseas. I guarantee this would ensure a much better grade of reporting.

WILLIAM N. WEIR

55 Lafayette Rd.

Reading, Mass.

"Who Should Command?"

To the Editors:

"Why should an airborne commander give up control of his troops during the fly-in?"

Well, why not? What's the matter with relying on a unit and its commanders to do a job for which, presumably, they have been specifically trained? Are we afraid that they'll take us to the wrong objective, scatter us over vast areas, deliberately crack up their own planes, knowingly fly us over enemy ack-ack when it could be avoided? I think not.

And where is the ground force commander who could command hundreds and hundreds of transport aircraft without spending years of study learning the technique? If he did, than he's no longer ground force—he's air force.

In an article in the November issue of the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* entitled "Who Should Command?" the author makes a comparison between trucks transporting a unit on the ground and transport planes transporting a unit by air from the departure air bases to the airhead. On the surface the comparison seems logical enough. But a little digging makes it appear ridiculously basic. Ground force commanders are qualified to control their units when transported in trucks on the ground. They are capable of picking routes, loading the vehicles, controlling the columns by guides, strip maps, control points, military police. They can designate security measures, blackouts, movements by day or by night, movement by infiltration or any system. They can control the private who drives the truck by placing one of their own NCO's or officers next to him in the front seat. They can retain the trucks, tell the drivers where to go and how to get there for more supplies or more units. Because the ground force commanders can do these things, naturally and obviously there is no need for them to relinquish command of their units during a motor movement.

See what I'm driving at? Let's substitute planes for trucks in the above paragraph (as is presumably the author's intention and the basis for his comparison) and see if the ground commander can still do with planes what he could do with trucks. Is the ground commander so familiar with air force technique that he can specify formations to be flown, and analyze flak charts so that he can pick routes? Can he locate IPs, determine



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direction to be flown over the DZs and LZs? Can he say where fighter escort should pick up the troop-carrier columns? Naturally there's much more to transporting units by air than I've mentioned. It's a highly specialized and technical business. If it weren't, privates would fly airplanes just as they drive trucks. No reflection on the truck driver, but he doesn't have to know quite as much as a pilot. My point is this: planes and trucks serve the same purpose—they get you from here to there. But there ends the parallel. Flying is slightly more complicated than driving. I say the ground commander doesn't know enough to command the fly-in phase.

While I'm on the subject, I'd like to mention a few more things. One, let's get over this feeling that the Air Force is peopled with nothing but flyboys and plane jockeys whose only desire is to be "off in the wild blue yonder" doing victory rolls or chandelles, who have nothing else on their minds but flying one airplane. There are those in the Air Force who are like that just as there are men in the airborne units who want to do nothing but go out and make four or five jumps a day and do little else to justify their existence. They're jump-happy. Well, that's OK too. We need that kind of man to show the rest of us that there's nothing to jumping and that we should be paying the government money to let

us jump instead of collecting from it for the privilege.

But the Air Force is populated with thinking, intelligent beings in the same proportion as the ground forces. Make no mistake about that. They know what they're doing. Maybe they have neglected some phases of support for the Army. But that's going to work out. And both the Army and the Air Force are pointing toward a common goal—victory.

Based on the hypothesis, then, that the Air Force is an intelligent organization trying to achieve the same end as the Army, let's trust them to carry out their responsibility—getting the Army to its objective. Without control, they can't assume that responsibility.

Another thing, the author of "Who Should Command?" says: "After the first few days of an airborne operation, the need for large numbers of transport aircraft diminishes, and relatively few aircraft are required for continuing air support." What kind of an operation is that? Certainly, there will be that kind of airborne operation—like those in World War II where a quick hook-up by other ground forces was planned and anticipated. But what of the strategic airhead, wherein airborne units make the initial assault, are followed up by air transported units until a force is built up which will break out of the airhead and accomplish a strategic mission, all the while supplied, reinforced and evacuated by air? Isn't that a possibility? Can't we plan for that kind of a fast attack, dealing a knockout blow to the enemy in his own back yard? In that kind of an operation, the kind the airborne folk would want, the need for aircraft will not diminish. It will increase.

And another quote from the same article: "It is recognized that there are certain specific airborne missions in which the Air Force might have primary cognizance [interest?] in the operation such as the seizure and holding of airfields in furtherance of air operations." So what? Do we then put an Air Force commander in command of the forces on the ground just because we're going after an airfield? I don't believe we would. The ground force commander knows how to maneuver his forces to take an airfield just as he knows how to use them to take any other objective.

And the statement that "if the airborne joint force commander is selected from the air force he must be present and direct the ground action in the objective area" is absurd. No air force commander in his right mind would desire, seek or accept, without a struggle and a direct order, such an assignment.

Let's stay in our own bailiwicks. Let's keep cool and rely upon the ability of our brother services. The Army has enough to do without encroaching upon the Air Force's zone of interest. The Air

Force is a big boy now and can do its job without the guidance of father Army. It may be hard to take, but they're competent, too. Let's not squabble. Unification is hard enough, but it is going to be harder if we try to take away from each other that which rightfully belongs in the other's domain. In my opinion, the fly-in of airborne troops is within the domain of the Air Force.

MAJ. EDWARD M. FLANAGAN, JR.

Artillery

Box 110, McNair Hall
Fort Sill, Okla.

Give Us More

To the Editors:

In regard to your question as to "how many types of infantry" in your February issue, what about:

Grenadiers, Infantry of the Line, Jägers, Rifles, Legionnaires, Francs-Tireurs, Guards, Musketeers, Fusiliers, Bersaglieri, Yeomanry, Highlanders, Lowlanders, Gurkhas, Guides, Sikhs, Punjabis, Rajputanis, Dragoons (dismounted), Sappers, Miners, Guerrillas, Partisans, Men-at-Arms?

I think COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is fine, although I miss the pleasure I used to get from reading both the *Infantry Journal* and *The Field Artillery Journal*. Alas! now I only have one magazine to look forward to, rather than two. Perhaps you could double the size of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL in order to please me more?

LT. DONALD R. PERKINS

Artillery

514 C. Bradshaw Ave.
Van Horn Park
El Paso, Texas

Book Reviews

To the Editors:

You can put me down as one non-combat subscriber who feels that you certainly have a very fine magazine.

Should you, for any sad and completely unexpected reason, have to discontinue the publication of the bulk of the JOURNAL, I would be glad to continue my subscription to your book reviews, which I consider in themselves worth the price of the whole. The review in the February issue, of Mr. Churchill's last volume, is a prime example of what I mean.

LT. COL. A. N. BRAY
Ordnance Corps

Detroit Arsenal
Center Line, Mich.

It's a Profession, Too

To the Editors:

Expanding certain remarks in Mr. Martin's letter in your January issue, I desire to give my viewpoints on the issue of the Army and/or Armed Forces as a "... very poor place for men who look

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forward instead of backward."

The implications in this statement are prevalent in the minds of many American citizens. Since the Korean war this condition of mind has been somewhat altered, but still much is left to be desired in correcting the fallacies and prejudices concerning the consecration of our lives "... before the altar of military orthodoxy."

The advancements and innovations in military science since World War I are equal in scope with any other field of applied science. From whence do such advancements come? Surely not from men who look backward. Surely not from men of military orthodoxy. But from men who have been looking forward and still are.

Mainly due to the loose and unqualified talk of men who were but briefly exposed to the military in World War II, the thought of the military career as a rather stodgy, somewhat vulgar profession in which progress, free thought, and advancement are discouraged has been propagated.

In these critical times such a thought should be combated at every turn. For there is nothing which irritates your military man more than when he receives the sad, pathetic I'm-so-sorry-for-you look of a civilian who has just learned that you are a member of the regular Armed Forces.

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People do not seem to recognize the fact that the military is a profession which is comparable in every way to that of law, medicine, or science. It is high time that more people recognize just what we are—the men who devote lives and a lifetime to preserving a democratic government on this earth.

LT. DONALD V. MCCLOSKEY
USMC

U. S. Naval Hospital
Oakland, Calif.

Shorter Pistol

To the Editors:

In the January issue Lt. Col. Elmer Whitman, in his article "Pistol Packing UN Policeman," states that the service pistol was changed "from a smooth-shooting .38 revolver to a blasting, bucking .45" to deal with "a fanatical bolog-wielding enemy" and suggests a return to the .38.

What makes Colonel Whitman think our present enemy is any less fanatical? There is very little difference between the Moro *juramentado* and the rabid communist—both believe their cause is the just one, and are willing to die, if they can come to grips with an unbeliever, and kill him. It takes a heavy slug, with plenty of shocking power, to stop an enemy like that. However, I agree that the present pistol is too clumsy—but why not issue a .45 revolver with a 3½ inch barrel, of the type used by the FBI? Such a weapon can be used in very close quarters, it can be carried in a spring-clip under the arm, and is heavy enough to stop anything on two feet.

It may be argued that such a gun is a gangster's weapon—but so was the tommy gun.

F. L. CASTILLA

336 W. 19th Street
New York 11, N. Y.

The 65th Infantry

To the Editors:

The 504th FA Bn at Ft. Kobbe, Canal Zone, would be very happy to read an article in the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL about our fellow soldiers fighting in Korea with the 65th Infantry Regt. They

have been with the 3d Division all the time. It seems that the press has forgotten about all small unit actions in Korea. Thanks, and hoping to read a good article about the 65th Inf. Regt. from Puerto Rico.

SERGEANT ROBERTO O. BORRAS

Box 361
Fort Kobbe, C. Z.
• We'll do our best.

State Guardsman

To the Editors:

Please pardon using back of your letter, but it is the only thing available and I don't want to delay. You have certainly done your part and I apologize for my negligence.

Since May 1950, I have been on the road nearly all the time and do not have the time to read the JOURNAL any more. I sincerely regret this, but it can't be helped for the present. The JOURNAL has been a monthly item on my reading agenda for nearly ten years. I have benefited by every issue.

When the Tennessee State Guard was organized I enlisted as a private (rear rank) and started reading the JOURNAL along with books and manuals purchased from you. Through the months and years following I advanced through the grades to lieutenant colonel. While I have never considered myself as outstanding in the military, I am sure any good work that I was able to do was largely guided by the lessons and knowledge I received from the JOURNAL. In 1944 I solicited subscriptions from every officer and noncom of the first two grades and we were thereafter listed on your honor roll as a hundred per-center. Our renewal rate remained at one hundred per cent and even though we have been disbanded since 1946 I believe that all the former members are still regular readers. I cannot praise the work that you are doing too highly, and I am sure no member of the regular service would be without the JOURNAL and a State Guardsman can't afford to, who is after all only a half-baked civilian trying to lend a hand in a pinch.

At such time as I can start reading the JOURNAL again I will be back on your roster.

LT. COL. JAMES W. HILL
Tenn. State Guard Reserve
158 Lester Road
Chicago Heights, Ill.

Use Your Weapons

To the Editors:

Congratulations on Colonel Lynch's reminder [March issue] that our own infantry weapons will give our attacks powerful impetus if we but learn to use them properly.

MAJOR MORTARMAN
Infantry

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EDITOR

Col. Joseph I. Greene, Inf-Rtd.

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

John B. Spore

ASSISTANTS TO THE EDITOR

Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

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April 1951

COVER: Recoilless Rifleman in Korea. (Department of Defense photo)

WAR WILL BE MODERN WHEN ...

Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg

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YOU AND YOUR ARMY

Patton Story

IN our next issue we plan to bring you a critique (which may not be the right word) of General Patton in war and peace, written by one of his Third Army staff officers. It is, we think, a highly interesting and unforgettable picture of a fighting man who, when the shooting stopped in the spring of 1945, realized it was his last war and didn't like to think it was.

But here we want to tell another Patton story: one that we are glad is down in print in James Huston's *Biography of a Battalion* (reviewed on page 50). A few weeks before the invasion of Normandy General Eisenhower and General Patton made an inspection of the 35th Division then assigned to the Third Army in England. They came upon a platoon of Company L, 134th Infantry, engaged in a squad problem, just as the "enemy" machine gun opened fire. One of the members of the "attacking" squad, a Private Liffrieg, fell to the ground and began to crawl in the wrong direction. General Patton rushed up to him.

"Where in the hell do you think you're going? The government gives you a brand new uniform and you crawl all over the damned ground with it. Where in hell did you ever learn that?"

"In the States, sir," Private Liffrieg answered.

"That's just where the hell you ought to be now."

"I wish to hell I was, sir!"

At that moment General Eisenhower spoke to General Patton and diverted his attention from the soldier.

On reflection this is as much an

Eisenhower story as a Patton story. General Ike, knowing the low boiling point of his fightingest general, smoothly stepped in between the lieutenant general and the private.

A general officer in the Pentagon recently sent us a paragraph from a letter he had received from an officer on General Eisenhower's staff. "General Eisenhower," the letter read, "has that wonderful and rare quality of getting the very best out of everybody and making each and everyone of them like giving him their very best." Including George Patton and Private Liffrieg.

Men of Quality

HISTORY is repeating itself. As in World War II, young Americans who are intelligent and physically above par and approaching draft status find there is keen competition for their services. The Air Force and Navy have their flight training programs and all kinds of technical jobs that can be made to sound mighty attractive. The Marines have their esprit. The Army has a little of everything except glamor. You can always get in the Army, so you take a look at what the others are offering. It dawns on you that you are in a seller's market and that your services are highly desirable. So in the best Yankee-trader tradition you shop around for the best offer. If you're not pretty sharp you may get hornsogged but you never know what score you'll make, anyway, when you play the pinball machines.

If asked, most young men would probably agree that this is a hell of a way to run a railroad or a national military establishment. Military service in time of emergency or war

should be based on loftier ideals than those common to the marketplace. But the young men didn't organize the competition or make the rules. And so it is unfair to say that they are soft or lacking in bravery because they don't volunteer for the infantry, armor or artillery. It is the system that is at fault.

How the system works was shown in part by the report of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on its investigation of Lackland Air Force Base last January. "The genuine tragedy of the Lackland Air Force Base situation is not the inconvenience and discomfort of the enlistees," the report said, but "the inexcusable waste of manpower caused by the selfishness of the Air Force." The selfishness, the report said, lay in the fact that "the Air Force made a deliberate effort to enlist beyond its capacity too great a share of the 'good material' available from the ranks of the nation's youth." What this meant to the nation was interpreted by the Subcommittee in these words:

"The loss to the nation is incalculable, but certainly it is serious. Men of high intelligence who might have made invaluable officers for the Army are now consigned to the ranks of the Air Force as privates. Of course, some of them will eventually rise to the rank of Air Force officers, but many more of them will not be able to do so and their greatest potential contribution to the effectiveness of the armed services will never be fully realized. The Air Force's apparent unconcern for the other services is not merely a rebuff to the spirit of unification, it is also an attitude detrimental to the best interests of the nation.

"If ever there was a persuasive argument for compelling all the

armed services to draw their manpower from the common pool through selective service, this performance by the Air Force is it."

We can and do regret that any military service should be chastised in language so strong as that. The Air Force was playing the game according to the rules established before World War II. But it is still true that the rules are unfair and the nation has suffered from such policies. And so we can hope that out of this experience better methods can be developed. It is reported that the Department of Defense is working on it. Secretary Marshall is certainly aware of the problem. It was often before him in one form or another when he was Army Chief of Staff.

As the quality of manpower available to Army Ground Forces declined during World War II, the late General McNair of Army Ground Forces found it necessary to make repeated protestations to the Army General Staff. "The Army Air Forces have sources of manpower which are not available to the Army Ground Forces," he wrote on 2 September, 1942. "They are permitted to drain the Army Ground Forces of all acceptable material for aviation cadets, air crew and glider pilot training. They secure a large number of highly intelligent personnel by recruiting."

General McNair was big enough to see the whole problem. "The enormous problems of the Air Forces are appreciated," he wrote in the same letter. "They should be assisted in every reasonable way. . . . While the Air Forces have heavy and important needs in enlisted technicians, they have a large proportion of commissioned officers (well over twice as large) which should permit the effective utilization of enlisted men of average intelligence. . . . The Ground Forces admittedly have fewer technical demands than the Air Forces, but need high-grade and intelligent enlisted men as combat leaders. . . . Thus it is reasonable to assert that the needs of the Ground Forces for high-grade leadership by non-commissioned officers counterbalance the needs of the Air Forces for enlisted technicians."

A couple of months later he was protesting again. He noted that he had received a letter from General Eisenhower who was concerned about the weakness of junior leadership

among American troops in Great Britain. If the trend continued, General McNair warned, it might become necessary to lower the qualifications for officer candidates in the ground arms. At about the same time the In-



spector General of the Army reported that more than a third of the privates at various air bases were men in AGCT Classes I and II. More than half of these highly intelligent privates, he reported, were serving as "messengers, warehousemen, clerks, guards, orderlies, truck-drivers, firemen and assistant cooks."

Despite General McNair's recurring protests little was done until late in the war when the Air Forces had grown to full size and the needs of the ground combat arms, principally if not solely, infantry, became acute. The physical profile system was then introduced. General McNair had a great deal to do with that too. He had held that the ground combat arms not only needed more men of superior intelligence but also needed stronger soldiers with better physiques. He put the two together. " . . . professional men or skilled workers come from the more privileged classes, which are better fed and housed, and, as a result, have better physiques, generally," he wrote in December 1943. He recommended that assignment be made by physical groupings rather than by occupational specialty. Out of these recommendations came the Physical Profile Plan. Under it the ground arms got a better shake on the available manpower but its success was limited by special provisions.

Today's situation is not greatly different from the early days of the last war. The Army is the only service taking draftees and the recruiting stations are wide open and flourishing. The Air Force has reduced its minimum standards to take in men with an GCT score of 80 or above. But in actual practice, so some of its critics say, it has found that it can get all the men it needs and more by skimming

only the cream of the applicants who apply to recruiting stations. This means that while their published standards are lower, their practice is to select men who grade well up in intelligence.

Army standards for induction or enlistment are lower than any of the services. The Marines which by occupational test come closest to the Army in their requirements, are now taking men with a minimum GCT of 90, which is even higher than the Air Force's 80 (to go down to 70 soon). The Navy's is 85. The Army's 70.

The average GCT of enlisted men in each service or the numbers in each GCT group are impossible to obtain. One Marine source revealed that in a single month their enlistees averaged a whopping 107. The Air Force says that six months ago their average was about 90.

In the last five months of 1950 the Army inducted or enlisted 281,777 men. Of these, 54.4 per cent had a GCT of 90 or less and a high percentage of this number were under GCT 80. When you realize that noncommissioned officers and specialists should have a minimum GCT score of 90, the Army's problem becomes apparent. But it will probably get worse before it gets better. The Army anticipates that by the time you read this 25 per cent of the men it is getting will be below GCT 80 and some falling under the minimum of 70. The Army's two present missions—reinforcements for Korea and training a cadre army as a basis for large-scale mobilization if it becomes necessary—can hardly be accomplished with manpower of such low quality.

The ground combat arms are getting the best of the men the Army does get. The Army's branch training rate tables show this clearly. The Infantry and Armor get the best men, physically and mentally. The Artillery comes close to them but does get a few more men with physical and mental abilities slightly under the highest quality. However, there is one joker in this new deal. The manning tables are based on the supposition that the Army will get a fair crack at a cross-section of the Nation's youth. If it doesn't—and it isn't—the tables don't mean much because the standards have to be lowered all along the line.

One thing we never see presented accurately and fairly is the true reason why the Army's Combat Forces need

men of high intelligence. Even those who sincerely argue that they do, usually come up with the wrong reasons.

It does take good, bright men to handle the modern machinery of war, but this mechanical part of it doesn't take supermen of any sort. What takes the real brains is combat, not merely the tools of combat.

The Air Force doesn't have a single place filled with corresponding rank that requires intelligence as quick and broad as that of an infantry squad leader. And which requires the highest order of thorough analysis and rapid decision—the duties of a combat pilot, or those of a combat captain or lieutenant of armor, infantry, artillery, engineers, and so on.

Your combat airman needs much mechanical knowledge and knowledge of what his machine can do and the split-second ability to apply it. But in every battle your ground combat forces leader has a dozen possible decisions to choose from, and a hundred proper chores of leadership to carry out—which, as a whole, require a greater (and somewhat different) type of applied intelligence, including plenty of the mechanical, too.

Certainly, the Army's Combat Forces need brains. But let's give the right reasons why they do.

Foot Soldier's Saint

YOU may recall that in our December issue we mentioned the patron saint of artillerymen, Saint Barbara, and went on to say that the infantryman doesn't have a patron saint and that we were going to look into that some day. Well, the looking into has been taken care of by our readers.

In our February issue Colonel W. R. Scott reported that he had read in an article in the pre-World War I *Infantry Journal* that St. Maurice was the patron saint of foot soldiers. We now have a letter from Mr. J. N. Tappe of Long Beach, California, who tells us that the *National Catholic Almanac* lists the patron of archers as St. Sebastian; of armorers St. Dunstan; of knights St. Michael; and of soldiers generally St. Hadrian, George, Ignatius, Sebastian and Martin of Tours. Mr. Tappe suggests that St. Sebastian would be an appropriate choice since archers were "certainly the forerunners of riflemen." St. Michael, he thinks, should be the patron of Armor since knights were the

first wearers of (non-mobile) armor.

A former colleague on the staff of the *Infantry Journal*, Major Dan Herr, Infantry, USAR, writes from Chicago that the "problem of the foot soldier's patron saint has intrigued me" and that he had been looking into it. He votes along with Colonel Scott for St. Maurice.

We checked back with the Office of the Chief of Chaplains and talked with Chaplain O'Neill. He is for St. Sebastian but can't find any authority to back him up.

This confusing situation could possibly be cleared up if we had a Chief of Infantry who could issue a directive for the information and guidance of all concerned. But without such a fount of authority the only thing we know to do is to give our readers the facts and let each choose his own. The work of our volunteer researchers indicates that the most likely choices are either St. Maurice or St. Sebastian.

Mr. Tappe tells us that St. Sebastian was an officer in the imperial bodyguard of the Emperor Diocletian. When it was discovered that he was a Christian—this was in 286 A.D.—he was handed over to the Mauritanian archers for execution. Though pierced with many arrows, his wounds were slight and he recovered. His feast day is January 20. Mr. Tappe says that St. Sebastian seems to be a "logical choice to invoke protection against small arms fire."

Major Herr tells us that St. Maurice was commander of the Theban Legion of Christians in the army of Maximianus Herculus. The army while on the march across the Alps to suppress a revolt in Gaul, encamped near Agaunum in Switzerland and "prepared for the battle with public sacrifices." (That quotation and the one following are from the *Book of Saints* compiled by the Benedictine Monks of St. Augustine's Abbey, Ramsgate.) "The Christian legion refused to attend (another version says that they refused to attack innocent people) and were in consequence twice decimated. When they still persevered in their refusal they were massacred *en masse*. Among those who suffered were Maurice. . . . At Agaunum, now St. Maurice-en-Valois, a basilica was built (c 369-391) to enshrine the relics of the martyrs." The feast day of St. Maurice is September 22.

As of now the vote stands:

St. Sebastian — 2 (Chaplain O'Neill and Mr. Tappe)

St. Maurice — 2 (Colonel Scott and Major Herr)

Army Almanac

THE new *Army Almanac* isn't the kind of a book that a reviewer can consider and report on as a whole. It has a great many virtues and more than a few faults, some of which, we hasten to add, are not necessarily to be blamed upon the compilers. Some of the faults may be because it was so long in the making and some perhaps because, so we have a distinct notion, the compilers had so many people breathing over their shoulders as they worked. Unfortunately some very vital sections of the book are outdated in 1951; the book was "current as of October 1948" a footnote to the foreword says. It is incredible that it would take twenty-seven months to get a book of facts published.

The compilers put together all kinds of information: current and historical, useful and irrelevant, fascinating and tedious. For example, all of the Secretaries and Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of War and of the Army are listed but you'll look in vain for the names of the Generals in Chief of the Army from Washington to Nelson Miles. You can discover that the Secretary of the Army is President of the National Forest Reservation Committee but you can't find the name of General Halleck or any explanation of his title of Chief of Staff.

One more point. Many of the descriptive articles of the larger establishments and agencies of the Army and the other services appear to have been written by the establishments or agencies themselves. That is, perhaps, as it should be. But the editors could well have considered the relative importance of each and allotted space on that basis. We find that more than ten pages are given to a description of the activities of the Quartermaster Corps and only five to the Medical Services and less than four to the Corps of Engineers. The proportions don't seem quite right.

The *Army Almanac* is a subject that we may come back to many times because it is the kind of book that we are going to be turning to constantly

(Continued on page 38)

... but that they die like sheep

Captain Edward D. Doyle

If men fight and die for reasons and causes they do not understand may it not be because the outworn concepts we cherish do not permit us to support with all our energy the program that will bring understanding?

BASIC recruits complain that TI&E is dull. Commanders, some of them, complain that it takes up time or that it isn't needed at all. S-3s complain that the time could be used for more important training. S-1 complains that it ties up personnel. Often S-2 and S-4 have their own complaints. And platoon leaders theirs and squad leaders theirs.

And too often the gripes are justified.

At far too many places, TI&E has been and still is dull.

TI&E does tie up personnel. Not only for the "undivided hour weekly," but for preparation. Initial preparation such as the forty-hour discussion leader's course. Plus the weekly briefing sessions. Plus the hour itself. But AR 355-5 is right, too. It's still in effect.

So the commander and the recruit and the S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4, the leaders (platoon and squad), and everybody else has the duty of doing all he can to change things so that TI&E will not be dull and time-consuming. How?

There is one way. And only one.

Beginning with the highest echelon of command, the Army must get behind TI&E—

One moment, please.

The highest echelon of command is behind TI&E and has been since the inception of the program.

AS ONE chief of TI&E described its beginnings: "In 1942, with our backs to the wall and with every material consideration counseling against it, we undertook a gigantic program of civic education, a program that was eventually to gather strength and grow until it encompassed the whole realm of education. This program brought with it a philosophy of human relations that is gradually eroding outworn concepts too long dignified as traditions."

How are your outworn concepts, soldier?

How are yours, Captain?

Yours, Colonel?

General?

"Why, in those dark days," the statement continued, "did the Army launch this program? Because we had learned late in 1941 that great numbers of our young citizen-soldiers were literally ignorant . . . had little knowledge of the human values at issue in the world arena, values that they would soon be called upon to preserve at the ultimate price of their lives. Was it not the poet Vachel Lindsay who passionately cried 'Not that they die, Oh Lord, but that they die like sheep!?' Thus

we found the shocking fault in our armor and moved to repair it as best we could."

One of the means adopted to repair the armor was TI&E.

"Not that they die, Oh Lord, but that they die like sheep!"

IF MEN in Korea do not understand clearly why they are fighting there, whose fault is it?

Whose but those of us who did not try to help them understand?

Is your conscience clear, sir?

Have you asked when you would be able to "get around to training troops for combat," implying that the Troop Information Program is no part of combat training?

Have you put your best-qualified man on TI&E duty? Or have you found a home there for the man who hasn't pulled his weight on any other job?

Have you sent your TI&E personnel to the Armed Forces Information School for training? There are quotas available.

Have you lent some weight to your TI&E program by attending the Troop Information Hour regularly yourself? Or frequently? Have you ever been there, sir?

Have you required your staff to attend? If your answer is the answer required by AR 355-5, then the TI&E program is in a healthy state in your organization.

It all boils down to this! TI&E must have command support, the ultimate in command support at every echelon. Give it such support and nobody will call the program dull. Give it such support and it will achieve the four aims listed as follows by its former head:

"First, and perhaps most important, we strive to foster the dignity and the integrity of the individual soldier, in contrast to that traditional military anonymity that crushes the spirit, that leads a soldier to refer to himself as a dogface, as a GI.

"Our second aim is to bring to our young men an understanding and an appreciation of the American ideal; to nourish that ideal; and to build an abiding belief in the future of our country and the democratic process.

"Our third objective is to provide an answer to the soldier's eternal and inevitable question 'Why?' We base this on the fact that the American soldier can be led but not driven; and to lead him, he must be given an adequate and an intelligent explanation of the things he is called upon to do.

"Our fourth objective is to keep the men of our Army aware of the great national and international issues that confront us from day to day; in order that each man may understand the vital interest those matters hold for him, as a soldier and as a citizen."

CAPTAIN EDWARD D. DOYLE, Infantry, USAR, is on extended active duty at Camp Roberts, California, serving as Troop Information and Education Officer.



We Can Have More Rifle Fire

Major Charles E. Hiatt

Imaginative leadership and training can conquer the infantryman's buck fever

WE SPEND much time and effort training leaders in the strategic and tactical control of their units, but far too little in teaching the individual fighting man to fire effectively once he is in position to do so. In fact, we don't think of these seriously as separate problems. We just assume that every man will fire his weapon at the enemy when he has an enemy to fire at. But as any soldier with combat experience knows, that notion is far from the truth.

MAJOR CHARLES E. HIATT, Infantry, commanded a rifle company of the 84th Infantry Division in Europe in World War II. He entered the Army through the ORC from Indiana University in 1941 and was integrated into the Regular Army in 1946.

The battles fought by rifle squads, platoons and companies are won primarily by firing more effectively than the enemy does. Yet the book still assumes that all men fire. This is what we find in the 1950 edition of FM 7-10, *The Rifle Company*, paragraph 70d (1): "When receiving effective small arms fire, all men of the squad instantly saturate the enemy with rifle and automatic rifle fire." Paragraph 70d (2) says: "When the immediate application of the squad's maximum firepower fails to destroy the enemy, the squad advances by fire and maneuver." On reading these sentences, I began to compare the picture of combat which the sentences envisage with combat as I saw it as a rifle company commander. There was plenty of difference.

No soldier can disagree with the objectives in those quotations. But I strongly disagree with the approach to tactics and combat which they typify. The inexperienced rifle platoon leader, platoon sergeant and squad leader read them as tactical gospel, then begin to train their men as if combat were a mechanical exercise. They may worry about morale, but only in terms of Special Service shows, passes and three square meals a day. They don't even think of the psychology of the soldier on the battlefield. They haven't been in combat themselves, most of them, so they don't know there is such a thing.

Squad and platoon firing exercises add to the false ideas because the

enemy pops conveniently into view as silhouette targets. One clip of ammunition per man always demoralizes the enemy. The first grenade always knocks out that bothersome machine gun. The squad or platoon then assaults at a dead run for about two hundred yards, and overruns the enemy position. The umpires count the bullet holes in the targets, inspect to see if all the participants in the exercise have had their hair cut recently.

Nobody stops to wonder if these furiously firing riflemen will fire just as fast and accurately when they are under fire.

WHEN this same platoon comes under enemy fire for the first time, what does happen? Everybody hits the dirt fast, and crawls right under his helmet. As soon as the platoon leader can convince himself that he isn't a Purple Heart candidate yet, he begins to wonder what happened and where his platoon went to. But no matter where he looks—and a worm's eye view does not cover much ground—all he can see is a few, a very few, of his men. He does not hear the familiar and reassuring noise of MIs, BARs and LMGs. Worst of all, he can't see the enemy. When he searches the ground ahead, all he can see is several acres of terrain, and the enemy may be in any or every fold of it.

His men have not done what the book said they would. The enemy is refusing to show himself as he did on the combat firing range. If he does not get killed exposing himself to fire in trying to get his men to fire and move, strong doubts of what he has learned will arise and persist, and he will find that he has to evolve a technique of combat very different from that implied so flatly in FM 7-10. As Colonel S. L. A. Marshall wrote he will find that "on the field of fire it is the touch of human nature that gives men courage, and enables them to make proper use of their weapons."

NOW WHAT about the rest of the picture? What was the reaction of the individual soldier when he first came under fire?

His knees knocked just as uncontrollably, and his teeth chattered just as loudly as his lieutenant's did. He is scared as hell, and he can feel it in his guts. He feels that every bullet

and every shell is aimed directly at him. And worse, when he does get up courage to look around him, he cannot see the enemy as his combat firing problems had taught him to expect to. All he can see is that same empty piece of ground which must contain enemy positions, but where?

Next, he looks around to see if Bill on his left and Joe on his right are as scared as he is. He can't even see them! Maybe they were hit; maybe they went forward; maybe they turned tail and ran! My God! Maybe I'm up here all alone! Firing his rifle is about the last thing he thinks of doing.

That kind of paralysis can demoralize a unit in less time than the telling takes. The outfit may not break, but it will be ineffective until somebody begins to fire and others follow suit. Or until the platoon leader and the squad leaders get around to reassure every man about the situation, and tell him what to do.

A leader of any rank or grade is sustained and steadied by his sense of responsibility toward his men. Many an officer and noncommissioned officer has carried out his duties to overcome his fear by the knowledge that the lives of his men depended on his decisions and actions. Men of automatic-weapons crews restrain their fears and resist enemy pressure because of loyalty to the crew and fear of their blame at failure.

The individual rifleman feels none of this. He may be loyal to his leaders and proud of his platoon, but under heavy fire he is one man. And so far as he sees or feels, his squad and platoon mates have gone off and left him alone in the face of the whole enemy army. Mortal danger is present in the form of the shriek and crash of artillery fire and the whisper and crack of bullets. He would shoot, but there is nothing to shoot at except a lot of rocks, trees, clumps of grass and maybe some buildings. In training he was taught to shoot at *simulated living targets*, and to make every shot count. Now what does he do?

A soldier under fire may not run in abject terror unless he is about to be overwhelmed or unless he sees his buddies also running. Neither will he advance of his own will or fire his weapon spontaneously unless he and a buddy get together and reassure each other (a small minority will fire spontaneously, but we are concerned here with the majority). Fear can be controlled and loneliness can be con-

trolled, but the two together are an almost unbeatable combination in breaking a man's spirit.

THE FACT is that in our battle training we have failed to include the control of fear. If tactics is the means by which the fire of a unit is brought to bear on the enemy, then the psychology of the men who are to fire the weapons of that unit must be fully considered. We have failed to prepare the soldier for the loneliness and quiet of a battlefield, and for his isolation within it. We have failed to prepare him to face and control the fear for his life which will come to him when he faces enemy fire. We have failed to realize that when a rifle squad takes cover, it is no longer an organization. For these reasons, the momentum and tactical cohesion of the unit disappear, at least temporarily. Every rifleman who cannot see and communicate with another is as ineffective as if he had lost his rifle.

We teach in our tactical training an automatic response when fired upon—take cover, build up fire superiority, and then assault. We forget that an older and more primitive instinct, that of self-preservation, can easily prevent a man from making the automatic response we want him to.

Fear exists in every veteran, as well as every newcomer. It will increase with the number of actions in which he participates. It numbs his brain and paralyzes his limbs. The so-called "bleeding" of a unit teaches the survivors how to control their fears and how to prolong their lives on the battlefield. It certainly does not make them more fearless. It can almost be stated as an axiom that the converse is true. The veteran infantryman has learned to do his combat job in spite of his fears, and the period during which he can go on keeping them under control is definitely limited.

How then can men be prepared for the battlefield so that they will be able to function as combat soldiers should? The key may lie in what happens in an automatic-weapons crew. Many have observed that a machine-gun crew will continue to serve its weapon when individual riflemen are fearful of raising their heads to fire. The sole purpose of an automatic weapons crew is to work as a team in the servicing and firing of one weapon. All else is subordinated. The task requires the crew members

to remain fairly close to one another. They are sustained by this visible nearness. Team spirit plus a definite task to perform, plus loyalty to the crew and fear of blame for failure combine to prevent each crew member from giving way to his fears which are just as great as those of the rifleman.

They can express their fears to one another and reassure each other. Merely talking about your fears often works like a safety valve in releasing nervous and mental tension. In this case, the requirements of the task—the servicing and firing of one weapon—have caused us, perhaps unconsciously, to take advantage of a basic human instinct and made it work for us—the herd instinct, or the desire of the human being for the companionship of his fellow human beings. There is no valid reason for believing that machine-gun crew members otherwise are different psychologically from riflemen. Their assignment is more or less accidental. Perhaps, then, one of the basic causes behind the widely known, but usually unexpressed and officially unacknowledged ineffectiveness of individual riflemen is the insistence upon their fighting alone.

Our small-unit tactical training is mechanistic. We think of and refer to each man of a rifle squad by a number. Our objective theory is that every man will act in the most efficient and effective manner while under fire. We insist, in spite of man's need for companionship, upon dispersion of individual riflemen so that they will not offer a remunerative target to automatic weapons and artillery. The squad tactics we teach are theoretically sound and effective, but our handling of men could be effective only if the squad were composed of robots. But riflemen, like all combat soldiers, are men, imaginative and scared.

Every squad and platoon leader finds in combat that fully as important as controlling the fire of his unit is the need to reassure his men and help them control their fears. Personal example is one of the finest methods. The high casualty rate among infantry squad and platoon leaders shows that it was widely practiced. But since the effectiveness of a unit depends in large measure upon good and lasting leadership, we should try to find some other means of accomplishing the same thing without sacrificing our leaders.

WE SHOULD experiment with grouping riflemen into small combat groups or teams. Encourage the individuals to stay close enough together so that they can be mutually supporting in the prone position, not only by fire, but more important by voice and the feeling of physical presence. Reduce vulnerability to automatic-weapons and artillery fires by dispersion of combat teams rather than by dispersion of individuals.

If there is a tendency toward increased vulnerability of the teams to these fires, it would probably be offset by their increased efficiency and speed of operation. Usually, it isn't the first fire a unit receives that causes the greatest number of casualties, but the fire it gets after it has been pinned down, and has ceased to move. And in terms of calculated risk fear and loneliness is just as ineffective as a wounded man.

Under this system a rifle squad would be organized into two or more combat teams: a supporting fire group built around the squad automatic rifle, and one or more maneuver groups made up of riflemen. Train and indoctrinate these men to fight as a team. Persuade every rifleman that his rifle is an effective and powerful weapon. Develop team spirit within these combat teams, and convince every man that the part he plays is essential to the success of the group. Then quit worrying about lack of dispersion of individuals within the teams. Dispersion of the teams themselves will answer the requirement.

True, the accepted tactical doctrine provides for a base-of-fire group and a maneuver group within the rifle squad. Yet the greatest emphasis is still placed upon the single rifleman fighting alone, but under the control of a squad leader who may or may not be able to get to him under fire, or even reach him by voice or signal. There may have been a day when the average American man was a completely self-reliant individual, hunting and trapping alone, but that picture has probably been overdrawn in our school histories and in the pulp magazines. The average recruit has lived as a civilian, in close conjunction with his fellows. He is accustomed to work and play as part of a group, not by himself. Requiring him to fight alone under conditions of mortal danger not only violates his basic instincts, but requires a com-

plete and often impossible shift from the way in which he has been accustomed to work and live.

Errors of organization and training are relatively easy to correct once the problem and error are recognized. It is far more difficult to bolster weakness of the spirit. It is impossible to teach a recruit to experience imaginatively the fear and loneliness that come to a man when he is under effective enemy fire. We can, however, condition men to the fact of the fear and loneliness of the battlefield, and devise squad battle formations that will enable riflemen to gain assurance from the physical presence of comrades. These cannot be offered as complete solutions to the control of battlefield fears, but they should help most men through the first bad moments when a unit comes under fire and all movement stops. Ultimately, of course, the control of fear must come from within the man himself for the Army can do little about character formation once a man has reached military age. On the other hand, officers and noncommissioned officers can learn to analyze more closely the make-up of their men, not as trained psychologists but as laymen. An officer or noncommissioned officer can and must learn what makes his men tick and give his orders and make his plans to take advantage of their personal and group characters. Otherwise his unit will never even approach a maximum combat effectiveness.

My solutions may not be fully workable but the problem is a real one. We now compute rifle fire power as the number of rifles available times the rate of fire. But all leaders must also learn that a man in position to fire may not do so, and that the reasons for his failure to fire are chiefly a product of fear and uncertainty. If the rifleman is again to reach the effectiveness of his Civil War counterpart, military thinking must be directed towards means of inducing him to fire his rifle.

To quote Colonel Marshall again: "The heart of the matter is to relate the man to his fellow soldier as he will find him on the field of combat, to condition him to human nature as he will learn to depend on it when ground offers him no comfort, and weapons fail. It is beyond question that the most serious and repeated breakdowns on the field of combat are caused by failure of the controls over human nature."

Add a Blue Stripe

Major Edward M. Flanagan

To handle the furtive and wily infiltrator the artilleryman in training is learning the lore of the infantryman

FROM his position on the ground, Major "Mortar" Martin raised himself up on his elbows, cocked his helmeted head in the general direction from which the crack of a Jap mortar had come, rolled over and grabbed his knee mortar from whose use as a side arm he had derived his nickname. He quickly set up his weapon, guessed at a range and direction, and pooped out his first round. At about the same time the battalion perimeter came to life. Mortars, light machine guns, grease guns, carbines spat into the pitch black darkness of what had promised earlier to be a quiet night. The Japanese patrol lobbed in a few mortar rounds but the blasts from the perimeter knocked off their accuracy. After about twenty minutes the Jap patrol pulled out, licking its wounds and dragging its dead behind it. The battalion perimeter settled down, Major Martin got back in his sack, and the only sounds to interrupt the quiet was the racket of another bat-

talion doing about the same thing.

At Ternate, Luzon, there was a close repetition of the incident. The battalion perimeter was organized with four-man foxholes every five or ten yards. It was reinforced at the corners with captured Jap machine guns, wired for inter-perimeter communication, and a few Jap knee mortars were spotted in the center of the area to give depth to the position.

But, wanting to make the acquaintance of the battalion in spite of the obvious "no visitors" signs planted about the place, a Japanese patrol sought to intrude one night. It came laden with gifts and assorted trinkets:

MAJOR EDWARD M. FLANAGAN, Artillery, is an instructor in the Department of Airborne and Special Operations, The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

blocks of TNT, fuzes, firing caps, and other paraphernalia obviously designed for people in the safe-cracking trade. Actually that was just about the trade of this particular group of Japanese for they wanted to blow up a hunk of metal or two if they could swing the deal. And therein lies this tale. This an infantry battalion? No, sir. It was a field artillery battalion defending itself against a series of Jap night attacks aimed at knocking out the pesky, troublesome howitzers, the bane of the existence (along with a few doughboys, of course) of the Japanese.

What's so important about that? Why shouldn't a field artillery battalion defend itself? What's so unusual about a field artillery outfit setting up a close perimeter with all the weapons it could capture, steal, or pick up from a generous infantry unit which had more than it needed of close-in fighting weapons?

To anyone who fought the Japanese in the late, great conflict, such foresight on the part of the artillery might seem commonplace. But to the warriors of the Crusade in Europe we suspect that such actions look like over-doing a good thing. Why should there have been a difference between two theaters of operations when the participating units generally received similar training? The answer lies in the difference in the tactics of the enemies.


FIGHTING the Japanese was like trying to stem the flow of mercury with a fork; you jabbed into the mass but it flowed around instead of halting. Consequently, the battle maps of the divisions fighting the Nipponese more often were marked with ovals or goose-eggs to designate the positions of units than they were with



lines which indicated a completely interlocked front. And if the positions of units had to be marked with ovals it meant that each unit was an entity in itself and that in between the ovals, in spite of patrols and contacts between adjacent units, there were gaps through which the enemy could infiltrate. The units behind the front had to be prepared to defend themselves.

The Japanese, masters of the art of infiltration, night attacks, and to-the-last-man stands, didn't let our artillery have the luxury of relying upon the infantry out front for protection. So when you fought the Japanese you had to have a well-manned, well-armed, closely-integrated perimeter around your artillery battalion. If you'll buy that, then you'll buy the

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new unit training program for field artillery units.

Based on the concept that there will be other enemies who are near masters of Japanese tactics (Koreans, for example), the new field artillery unit training program contains a lot of training formerly considered strictly in the realm of the infantry. And the hypothesis that the redleg must be given a good deal of infantry training is sound, because today's artilleryman, fighting in Korea, must be able to defend his position, patrol around his immediate area, and know a lot more about fighting a war than how to follow the sequence of the fire commands.

At least that's what the reports from the Korean front indicate. For example, a letter received at The Artil-

lery Center from an officer fighting with his artillery outfit in Korea had this to say:


Stress this at Fort Sill: Close defense of a battery position; . . . firing position emplacements that permit engagement against tanks by individual pieces; shifting of fire direction from battalion to any of the firing batteries; greater responsibility on battery commanders so that they can act on their own when necessary. Do this without in any way minimizing the fact that mass employment of artillery is the only productive way of carving a slice of any battlefield.

This suggests that an artilleryman must be able to defend himself against infiltrating enemy soldiers, must be able to fight as a small-unit-like battery, or even a section—and must be

able to engage and knock out tanks which often get to their gun positions.

NEWSPAPERS and magazines are full of stories of how the North Koreans (and Chinese) have the diabolic ability to infiltrate and to harass positions behind the infantry as well as the infantry units in the lines. The artillery is handling the problem by including in the unit training programs some 115 hours of almost pure infantry training. The entire training program for the normal field artillery battalion is 1,152 hours. A rapid calculation reveals, then, that ten per cent of the total time is devoted to teaching the redleg how to act like a doughfoot.

The subjects included in the 115



The jeep-mounted 105mm. recoilless rifle added to the Army's growing variety of weapons gets a workout at Aberdeen Proving Ground.

hours are somewhat as follows:

Techniques of fire and combat firing, 20 hours.

Mines and booby traps, 16 hours.

Cover and movement, 2 hours.

Scouting and patrolling, 8 hours.

Battle indoctrination, 6 hours.

Squad (infantry) tactical training, 44 hours.

Light machine gun familiarization, 15 hours.

Close combat course, 4 hours.

In addition, under night training, the training program prescribes that: "thirty-three per cent of the applicatory stage of all tactical training and training in movements will be conducted during the hours of darkness stressing individual and unit night discipline."

Of course, night training and some of the subjects on the list have been on field artillery unit training programs for years. But now the new program gets down to brass tacks and prescribes exactly what will be done to train the artilleryman in the doughboy's art.

AND IT'S a good thing. In the Leyte campaign, for example, two airborne artillery battalions of the

11th Airborne Division were completely divorced from their howitzers and sent off into the rain-soaked, jungle-covered hills of Leyte as straight infantrymen. The division commander was faced with a tough problem and a peculiar situation. But he solved it to the advantage of his mission.

Light machine gun familiarization—that's a peculiar subject of training when the field artillery units are not equipped with light machine guns. But it's excellent training, and whoever included it in the schedule was looking forward to combat and hoping that light machine guns would replace the caliber .50 machine gun on the field artillery battalion T/E or that field artillery units would obtain light machine guns by hook or by crook in the combat zone.

And that's something for the T/E makers to consider: Why not replace the cumbersome caliber .50 machine guns, ineffective against aircraft and generally too much gun for anti-personnel use, with the caliber .30 light machine gun? And while they're about it, how about some 60mm mortars for the light artillery battalions, at least? It might be that they're afraid the redlegs will be dropping

mortar rounds down the necks of our own infantrymen. Maybe, but they trust the artillerymen to fire much bigger stuff over the heads of the doughboys, and I think they can be trusted to fire mortars just as intelligently at the squirming, infiltrating enemy. If they don't want to replace the caliber .50 machine guns entirely, why not replace a few of them? They won't be missed.

CRITICS of a field artillery training program that includes a lot of infantry training, might say that an over-ambitious artilleryman, schooled and drilled in the ways of the infantryman, might be inclined to take off on his own, hunting enemy instead of remaining at his piece and firing artillery at an unseen enemy. Might be, but he wouldn't do it very often after the first time. The CO is still the boss and has ways of enforcing his will upon errant members of his command. Besides that, in stubborn cases, the artillery CO can always arrange a transfer for a man too well indoctrinated in the art of close combat. It might even be that some infantrymen—not many, naturally—might want to trade places with the bloodthirsty artilleryman. A mutual swap could be arranged.

Despite criticisms and arguments, the close-combat training of the artilleryman is sound. He learns how to deal with the enemy face to face instead of with an unseen phantom enemy just over the hill; he learns how to organize the defense of his position against a wily opponent; he learns how to move as part of a patrol, how to find out what's around his area; he learns how to fire small arms and finds out what they can do; he gains confidence through knowledge of what he can do to an enemy right in his position; and will therefore stand and fight and not commit the unforgivable mortal sin of abandoning his piece; and above all, he learns to appreciate what the doughboy is up against. In so doing, he automatically vows to himself, although he might not admit it to anyone else, that he will support the infantryman, whom he knows to have a rough, tough job at best, with all the intelligence and care that he can apply to his task. And that, in the final analysis, is what we wanted in the first place.

It may be that a psychologist wrote the new field artillery unit training program.



Napalm is an effective tank destroyer—and tanks in the open are good targets for tactical aircraft.

CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR POWER IN KOREA

MAJOR ELMER G. OWENS AND
CAPTAIN WALLACE F. VEAUDRY

The coordinated ground-air team can do the job but some improvements can be made in techniques and equipment

KOREA has been the proving ground for developments in tactical air power. And no better testing ground could have been devised. Old arguments and shibboleths can be forgotten. Korea proved—and no one should be surprised—that the combined air-ground team can do the job, if it is a closely coordinated team.

The experiences and first-hand information of the writers of this article are on the regimental level. We can only speak of the advantages, weaknesses and disadvantages of the present organization as seen from that level.

MAJOR ELMER G. OWENS, Infantry, and CAPTAIN WALLACE F. VEAUDRY, Infantry, are S-3 and assistant S-3 of the 5th Infantry Regimental Combat Team in Korea.

Control of tactical air in the Korean war has been through a tactical air control party (TACP) composed of one officer (pilot) and two radio men (one an operator and the other a repairman). The party is equipped with three quarter-ton vehicles, two of which mount radios. The radios are the SCR-522 and SCR-312. These teams are usually assigned to a regiment for twenty-one days and then are returned to their units. The practice of sending pilots for ground control work has resulted in closer cooperation between ground and air. After a turn of such duty, pilots better understand the nature of the targets they try to hit and the problems of the infantry.

The accepted system of operation in the 5th Regimental Combat Team

is as follows: Under control of the RCT commander the TACP team normally operates from the forward RCT command post directly under the supervision of the RCT S-3. Liaison type aircraft or an AT-6 are used to spot or locate targets reported by ground elements and also to guide tactical aircraft to the target. These aircraft have been instrumental in locating enemy concentrations, weapons and vehicles in routine reconnaissance as well as when these targets are reported by ground elements.

It is essential that the RCT S-3 or assistant S-3 stay with the TAC officer while a flight is being worked. Such close coordination between TAC officer and the RCT S-3 insures that targets are quickly located, friendly dispositions marked and changes in tactical dispositions noted. It prevents accidental strikes on friendly troops and shortens the time required to orient the flight and place the strike on the target. Rapid orientation saves fuel and permits the flight to devote more time to a careful coverage of the target and to remain over the target area long enough for ground observers to adjust strikes.

When the tactical situation permits, excellent close support can be achieved by having the TAC team move with the forward RCT CP to the vicinity of a battalion CP from which they can direct the planes by personal observation of the target area. A good example of fighter-bomber aircraft in a close-support mission directed on target by the

TAC officer (TACO) by personal observation occurred at Sobuk-San Mountain in September. The 5th RCT was in a defensive disposition west of Chindong-Ni with three battalions on line.

For four days the artillery which was extremely effective in most instances had pounded the ridge to the west of Sobuk-San, three hundred yards from our lines. Many of the enemy were caught in the open and killed or wounded. But those who holed up in the natural rock caves continued to launch attack after attack on our positions. Each day at daylight tactical aircraft were directed on the target but the attacks continued. Finally aircraft with napalm bombs were placed on the target and after that, attacks from that particular ridge were small compared to what they had been.

In another instance at Kogan-Ni, the command post of the 5th RCT was under heavy attack and in danger of being overrun. The tactical air party was able to contact three flights of planes and by means of "dry passes" the strikes were brought to within four hundred yards of the command post, again with napalm, 500-pound fragmentation bombs, rockets and caliber .50 machine guns. There wasn't a single casualty among friendly troops and a determined enemy was driven off.

AIR strikes directed by personal observation are highly effective against strongly fortified or defended areas where very close support is necessary. However, we used this procedure on only a few occasions because movement of the radios over rough roads frequently makes them inoperative. Sometimes the TACP cannot get where it would do the most good because of this difficulty with radios.

The L-5 or L-17 type planes are the best for spotting targets. The L-5 can get close to the ground, is slow enough to spot camouflaged targets and can stay in the air long enough to do the job. It is better than the L-17 because of the placement of its wings which permits better visibility.

The AT-6 is good for target spotting but its speed frequently causes the observer to miss camouflaged targets.

Ground patrols, observation posts and PW reports all provide informa-

tion which when passed to liaison craft by the TACP give the aircraft a definite point to reconnoiter, but rarely pinpoint a target well enough to call in air strikes without reconnaissance by liaison planes. This is not true in a defensive situation where concentrations of enemy troops, field pieces or other enemy equipment can be accurately observed by ground elements. In such cases ground observers telephone or radio adjustments as fine as fifty yards for strafing missions and for rocket fire on heavily fortified or dug in positions which cannot be neutralized by artillery. When necessary, infantry OP personnel, artillery forward observers, and 4.2-inch mortar observers can adjust strikes in front of their positions.

An aircraft strike is normally obtained by request to the Air G-3 through the regimental S-3. This requires that a definite target be located by one of the several methods we have mentioned. Depending upon the type of target and unit or area priority, planes are dispatched by the central controller. Upon arriving in the vicinity of the target area, the flight contacts the TAC team and is either placed on the target direct or sent to liaison aircraft to be guided to the target.

Too much reliance should not be placed on the reports of tactical aircraft as to whether or not a good target exists. They fly too fast to pick up well camouflaged emplacements. Reports of ground observers or by liaison aircraft are more reliable. At times, pilots feel they are being misused because they can't see what they are shooting at. There have been cases where pilots insisted they were directed on unremunerative targets but patrols dispatched after the strike found as many as three hundred enemy dead.

Occasionally a flight will be returning from an aerial reconnaissance and report to a TAC party, asking permission to work in the area and requesting targets. This procedure is not normal and is discouraged in order to insure the best use of the aircraft available.

THE central controller, located at division and higher headquarters, picks up all flights reporting to the area and dispatches them to a TAC team on a priority basis which is

established by analyzing requests submitted or targets observed. However, it is possible to obtain flights direct upon emergency request. These emergency requests are frequently relayed to the central controller by either tactical aircraft or liaison-type aircraft.

Several methods of target designation are used by ground units. White phosphorus or smoke fired by mortars or artillery are the most common. Liaison planes can designate targets by making dry passes at an area or target or by actually leading the attacking plane to the target.

Friendly troops can be designated and friendly front lines outlined by using panels, colored-smoke grenades, or white phosphorus smoke. There are complications, however. The enemy has captured many of our panels and uses them to confuse us. There have been instances, also, where the enemy has fired white phosphorus into our lines at a time when we were marking his positions with the same stuff. Obviously, it is difficult to control all weapons capable of firing white phosphorus at the instant you want to mark a particular spot along the front and the confusion of a pilot when he sees a number of blobs of white smoke rising from an area can be appreciated. The 5th RCT established an SOP which allotted a specific colored-smoke type grenade to each battalion. This has worked fairly well in the marking of our own lines.

All of the weapons and explosives used by fighter-bombers in Korea have been effective against ground targets. These include combinations of caliber .50 machine guns, 500-pound fragmentation bombs, para-fragmentation bombs, napalm, rockets and, in the case of the Navy Corsair, 20mm guns. Napalm is the most effective destroyer of enemy hidden in caves or well dug-in positions. Prisoners-of-war reports have indicated that enemy soldiers are more frightened of napalm than any other weapon used by us.

THERE are certain limitations in our present tactical air support system. Briefly, and by the numbers, they are:

(1) The most "lucrative" target gets first priority. This has led to certain abuses, sometimes unintentional, such as reporting exaggerated

figures of enemy concentrations which causes the central controller or Air G-3 to immediately put all planes in the area, even sometimes pulling some off of another target.

(2) Requests for attacks using a specified weapon or explosive are disregarded even though the TACP has recommended the type that should be against the target. Sometimes the wrong type of plane is sent against a target, again despite recommendations of the TACP.

(3) Flights are sometimes requested for specific times in order to tie in with an attack. Air G-3 grants the request and plans are made, but the flight fails to arrive at the pre-arranged time, thus delaying the operation several hours or more.

(4) Air charts are not made available to infantry regiments or the TACP. Normal flights have only 1:250,000 scale maps. This makes target designation by map coordinates very difficult.

(5) Tactical air control radios now in use are too delicate and bulky. They are extremely susceptible to wet weather and shock. Mountainous terrain limits their range and the operator is constantly exposed to enemy artillery, mortar, air and, sometimes, small-arms fire.

(6) Control and target designation are extremely difficult in attack and envelopment situations. Great care must be taken to determine friendly elements from enemy elements. This frequently delays effective air support. It is possible to render support well in advance of our forces but accurate close-in support is subject to error at a critical time.

IN our opinion tactical air support would be much more efficient if selected infantry officers were trained as tactical air liaison officers. These officers would be similar to the artillery liaison officers assigned to the infantry battalions. We also suggest that a trained officer be added to the T/O&E of each tank company with an infantry regiment and the tank companies of a tank battalion. It would still be necessary to retain the present tactical air party on a regimental level (Air Force personnel). The TAC officer would designate which tactical air liaison officer could best observe the target area. For example, if an RCT was in a defensive situation with three battalions on line (as was often necessary in the

early stages of the Korean campaign) and the enemy had made a serious penetration between two battalions, the TAC officer would designate which of the two battalions' air liaison officers would guide the aircraft to the target.

This method would enable air strikes to be made in more than one portion of the regimental sector at the same time, as each TALO could control a flight. It would also permit visual control of the strike and adjustment in a manner similar to the adjustment of artillery fires. In situations where the battalion TALO cannot observe the target, infantry observers with the front-line companies could relay the information. The use of front-line company observers to properly place a strike has been used very successfully by the 5th RCT on many occasions. Clearance over all target areas in the RCT zone must be controlled by the RCT commander through the RCT S-3 to make sure that all friendly elements are clear of the target area. Wire communications as well as the radio net would tie the battalion TALO into the TACP at regiment first, as the artillery liaison officers in a battalion are tied in with the regimental artillery liaison officer.

We firmly believe that propeller-type aircraft similar to the P-51 should continue to be produced and developed for close tactical support air missions.

A smaller, more durable, radio is needed for the ground elements which will net on two or more channels with aircraft radios. The ground radio should be capable of being carried on a packboard.

When possible, a tactical air unit should be placed in direct support of division-size units to facilitate the procuring and control of aircraft, type ordnance and priority of missions.

When a priority target is called to Air G-3 or a central controller the first flight dispatched should report its results or a request for verification of target should be made to the TAC team before more flights are dispatched and particularly before other flights are pulled away from other targets.

Requests by the TAC officer for specific type armament should be granted without question.

Flights requested for a specific time should be dispatched in time to arrive in the target area, or the unit making the request should be told that the

deadline cannot be met.

At least one complete set of air charts should be available to all regiments or issued to each TAC team. In addition, where a static situation exists, all aircraft should have small-scale maps (1:50,000) of the area over which they are to operate.

The TAC teams' radios should have the same channels as the aircraft and flights should be instructed not to change channels except on specific instructions of TAC officers. Many times control over a flight is lost because a flight leader switches to a new channel or to intercom and talks to his flight, leaving the TAC officer out of the net. This is particularly dangerous while working close support missions as it may be necessary to call a plane or a flight off of the designated target.

IN BOTH attack and defensive situations a liaison aircraft should be assigned to each RCT. The pilot would be required to know at all times the disposition of the elements of his RCT and through contact with adjacent RCT liaison craft insure constant coordination between units. This will enable enemy and friendly elements to be immediately identified, eliminate the chance of aircraft being directed on friendly troops and decrease the time between arrival of a flight and the time it can attack the target.

When communications with division or higher headquarters has been severed due to a rapid advance or for any other reason, permission should be granted to the regimental TACP to request the liaison aircraft or any fighter aircraft in the area to relay requests for air direct to a tactical air central controller.

Extensions for the headset and microphone should be added to the equipment of the TACP, so that members of the party can move away from their vehicles. This would be advantageous when it is desirable to move to a position to view the target that is inaccessible to vehicles, or for the TACP to take cover from enemy fire and still control fighter aircraft.

This article is in no way intended to detract from the outstanding support and the great role that the Air Force played in defeating the North Korean Army, nor is it intended to belittle the fine work of the tactical air control parties. We wrote it in hopes that some improvements can be made in tactical air control.

The Impetus for Honesty

Colonel Greybeard

Honor is many things, including simple honesty and punctilious regard for the spirit and letter of law

HONOR has always been part of the soldier's code. Integrity has always been considered essential in the good Army officer. But are we beginning to lose our sense of honor?

Honor in the Army means several things. It means willingness to fight, for example. But it also means, just as it does anywhere, plain old-fashioned honesty. It means that a man's word is as good as his bond, that when he signs his name to a paper it has the value of a sworn statement.

We often see evidence of chicanery in public life. We read of connections between office holders and racketeers. Sometimes a Congressman or a mayor goes off to jail, but often this is not held against him in the political world. Mr. George Allen, after many years in government circles has recently written a book in which he says, "I am a little ashamed to confess that petty corruption doesn't shock me very much, because—I have come to think of it as inevitable." On the other hand, the Army standards are still so high that when a major general was sentenced for dishonesty it was a real shock and he was described as the one bad apple in the barrel. And certainly we still have our battlefield honor, our willingness to fight. But there are signs of a decline in our sense of strict integrity.

There was a time when the signing of a certificate was a serious matter. It once fell to my lot, as officer of the day, to take my next door neighbor, a captain, and place him in confinement. He had been convicted by a general court-martial of only one crime, signing a false official statement, and he was sentenced to two years' confinement at hard labor. But not long ago I caused quite a commotion by refusing to sign the certificate on a travel pay voucher in blank. The lady clerk didn't know how to handle that one because it seems that everybody signs in blank

these days. Finally she appealed to her boss, who said I could come back and sign after the data I was to certify as correct had been entered on the voucher. Another indication of the present value of an officer's certificate appeared in the May 1950 *Infantry Journal* when a young officer recommended that the value of an officer's certificate and honor be restored. And even the Adjutant General's office which could reasonably be expected to require strict compliance with the regulations it promulgates, recently wrote this masterpiece of cynicism when I pointed out that an officer had officially signed a statement that he had complied with a regulation when

in fact he had not: "Certain conditions involved in particular duty assignments preclude strict compliance with regulations." The assumption seemed to be that the regulations could be violated if you sit in the proper seat, and the signing of the false statement didn't even merit a specific comment.

It has become far too common in my experience to see high-ranking officers disregard explicit instructions against the use of government automobiles for private purposes, or convenience. I have also known such officers to draw pay for airplane flights when it was questionable whether such flights were "frequently" neces-



sary and a minimum of flying was done, mainly to "qualify" for this pay.

THESE things appear to me to be below the standard of honesty that should be a characteristic of every Army officer. Just what are "honesty" and "honor?" My dictionary says, in part, that one who is honest does not cheat, steal or defraud and acts with careful regard for the rights of others, and that one who is honorable goes further and scrupulously observes the dictates of a personal honor that is higher than any demands of law or public opinion. All honesty and honor is based on some law whether it is the law of Moses for Christian and Jew or the Army Regulations for soldiers. As plainly stated therein, Army Regulations have all the force of law.

I believe that honesty is essential to the mutual trust which we must have in each other if we are to meet a real test as a military body. In time of peace, (or even in war, if winning) a military man provided with good pay, good food, snappy pin-up girls and ice-cold coke may not give too much thought as to whether he

can trust those above, below and alongside of him. But if we are to meet severe tests, and we are already doing so, mutual trust is utterly essential.

Each must believe that all are working together, for the good of the whole. There must be basic rules which all—high, low and medium—must follow in exactly the same way. If the rules or the laws are broken by those above it will be known by those below, and not only will there be widespread disregard of the law, but essential trust will disappear. If the rule says no looting, the general or the colonel or the major must not fill up an airplane, or a jeep or a bedding roll with stuff he picks up, especially if at the same time he denies the private the right to fill his pack. If the AR says no females in government airplanes, the general must not send his wife around in one, just because he is on a different "level." ("Levels" are not mentioned in regulations.) The high-ranking officer may think that those under him don't know the score or will realize that there is a "lofty ideal" behind his irregularities, but he will usually be wrong on both counts. Honesty on the part of all is essential, but the impetus for honesty must come from above. If the junior proves untrustworthy, he can be punished. If the senior lacks honesty, the junior can't punish him, but he may say to himself, "OK, let the b . . . get away with it, I'll take care of myself from now on," and his trust is impaired. Under favorable conditions the effects may be unimportant but if we get into a tough spot as an army, it could mean the difference between victory and defeat.

I FEEL sure that most of the individuals who do these things which I have discussed regard themselves as the personification of honor. To my mind, a lot of loose thinking is due to what might be called Robin-Hoodism in the Service. You remember Robin. He only took from the undeserving rich and gave to the deserving poor (including himself of course). How many officers have you heard brag "I could be put in jail for that, but damn it all if I hadn't taken that warehouse appropriation (or those troops from training) and built that golf course (or what have you) it would never have been done?" The same arguments were used by

Hitler and there is usually a matter of personal gain in prestige or promotion involved. But this justified our Robin Hood in his own mind and to himself he is still an honest man. You may say, "Well, what the hell, he did build that golf course (or what have you) and he couldn't have done so honestly, so didn't we gain?" I think not, on several counts—first, the lost training, or the lost warehouse space for supplies may cost us dearly in some future, bigger Korea. And second, nobody else will get any golf course money honestly, if apparently they can be built without specified funds or labor. And most important, such things spread dishonesty and break down essential mutual trust.

You may ask "Why didn't this particular Robin's staff tell him if he was violating regulations?" Two reasons are that they value their job and their efficiency reports.

A related practice and one which costs the Service much, not only in money but in loss of trust and respect, is the practice of devoting too much time and attention to visiting firemen, both military and civilian. Why should it ever be necessary to turn a post upside down every time some noted person, military or civilian, comes to visit? Why should troops stop training to cut the grass and polish everything in sight. Why should utilities personnel be pulled off of everything to get that special set of quarters ready (reserved and empty for months when some officer would give his right arm to have them)? Why should those trucks, needed for training, be put to hauling chairs for the garden party? Perhaps it is easier to impress some VIPs that way than by showing them well-trained troops and perhaps from such good impressions may come eventual promotions. But all this eats away the trust of the lower ranks.

This whole business deserves more attention from above. It is already the subject of plenty of talk from below. The higher ranking the officer the keener his sense of honor should be, the stricter his personal compliance with regulations for the proper use of government property and funds, and the better his example of personal probity. *The impetus for honesty must come from the top.* Without honesty we imperil mutual trust. As we lower morals we lose morale. And if it goes far enough and times get tough enough, we could fold up and lose a war.



KOREA . . . BY BELLY



A 3d Division rifleman bellies his way across an open piece of ground in the Eighth Army's cautious, probing drive to the north.

A Korean line-crosser is searched for weapons or contraband by an infantry corporal. The pack horse at the right boasts a 4745 MOS, specialist in light infantry weapons.



AND TRUCK

An artillery outfit on the move to a new position comes to a temporary halt on an icy mountain road somewhere in Korea.



Tanks of the 2d Infantry Division roll into position during a fire fight, while smoke rises from a burning Korean dwelling.



Dabs of black and white paint transformed the front of this Patton tank into a fearsome tiger.



A caliber .50 machine gun of the 24th Infantry Division dug in above the Han River pours fire at Chinese Communists across the valley.



GET EVERYBODY INTO THE ACT

Lieutenant Marshall Singer

I was very tired of the entire situation. After researching, rehearsing and reharsing my lectures until they shone like bright little jewels that would hold the keen attention of every man, about ninety per cent of the class would give me that undivided look for which every instructor strives. But what that other ten per cent did to me! I would be sparkling up to the clinching point of a lecture only to grind to a screeching halt—the third man from the left in the sixth row was sacked up colder than yesterday's rumor.

After watching the limited results of calling for attention through every motive from the patriotic to the terrible it began to dawn on me that in every group there is a small hard core



of somnambulists. Along with this came the idea of getting everybody to participate in order to avoid the general lethargy that is associated with a lecture. Once given a little thought this idea proved quite simple and effective.

First of all we have the I-throw-'em-you-catch-'em school. We are all familiar with the instructor who loses patience and finally lets fly a piece of chalk or an eraser at some slumbering student. I refined this a bit and it goes something like this. In my opening remarks I casually mention that I like to throw things. I emphasize the point by gently lofting a missile

a few feet into the air. I have used footballs, softballs and basketballs. Safety considerations prohibit the use of baseballs, grenades and soft tomatoes. I flip the balls around casually. This phase must not be overdone or the students will forget the lesson, and concentrate only on who's at bat. But only you, I, and the football know that each ball carries a question most appropriate to the subject. This question is typed on a piece of paper scotch-taped to the ball. Thrown in temper? Gosh, no! It's an instructional aid. We can add to this little trick by having the ball rapidly passed around the class room by the students until a whistle is blown. Who has the ball? McGurk. OK, McGurk, answer the question.

Another get 'em in the act routine is the who-in-heck's-got-the-next-question school. We make this double-barreled by hiding the questions. Half a dozen picture postcards carrying questions are scattered about the classroom. Number one is taped beneath a chair, number two is up in the corner of a blackboard, number three (this depends on the well known situation and terrain) can be slid into a textbook or a fatigue jacket, number four is delivered in mock haste by an assistant instructor, and so on. You can pull a string that releases a balloon which contains a question. Corny? Sure, but it keeps them awake and helps you drive across the point of your lecture.

Next, the hazing school. I bring this method of attention-getting to your consideration only because it has found wide favor in some circles and so deserves discussion. Most of these methods do get the class awake if only for a few moments, but they also have the disadvantage of putting a class on the defensive by either irritating the students to the point where they do not care about the subject

or else making them more concerned with what is going to happen next than with what they are being taught. Proponents of this method incline themselves to such sundry little items as firing automatic pistols in the air, screaming horribly during quiet spots in a movie, and setting off fiendish booby traps. They are also great admirers of the stand-up-sit-down-stand-up-sit-down-up-down-up-down routine. This moves the lecture into the physical training category and defeats the purpose of the instruction. Such a method should be resorted to only upon dire provocation. Another method favored by this active school is the coy gent who says: "As soon as I catch three men sleeping the entire class will stand up for the rest of the hour." Now he admits defeat initially, and if he plays it straight will in all probability end up talking for forty minutes to a class standing at attention. If he doesn't catch anybody until just before the class is due to be dismissed then he will have his hands more than full next time that group of students appears. There is always a bunch of eager beavers who will be determined to see that the class doesn't stand up. They will not hear much because they will be too busy swatting people on the noggin, who are drowsy, or else nudging someone.

Next, the double-or-nothing-sixty-four-dollar-question school. This is the perfect solution for the one-hour review on a subject. You phony up a microphone out of a piece of cardboard and a string, or else use a real mike. You adopt the air of a genial quizmaster and using your selected group of questions manage to cover your entire review. The only difference is that instead of a dry review of what may be a dry subject we have a lively, interesting hour that accomplishes the same end. When we ask our questions we treat our trainee just like the contestant of any big quiz show. "What is your name? Well, that's fine, and where are you from, Private Jones? Brooklyn? Great, anyone else from Brooklyn? [Applause] How do you like the food in our mess hall? Ah, yes." Then on to the question.

I've seen this work wonderfully well where the instructor gave away T&E manuals, rolls of toilet paper, five-cent tubes of shaving cream, as prizes for the right answers. I've also seen

LIEUTENANT MARSHALL SINGER, Infantry, is a member of the 82d Airborne Division.

it do just as well in the field where the platoon answering the question right was awarded a rock. Just a plain old rock. Yet, before the hour was up the "quiz kids" were fighting it out to see that their platoon had the most rocks. This idea can also be hammed up by advertising inane items such as "Food. Comes in three delicious flavors: Lunch, Breakfast, and Dinner. You can't live without it." Any other ideas based on the personality of the instructor and class makes for a lively hour of attention and participation.



One final school remains and that busy swatting people who are drowsy on the noggin, or else nudging someone to nudge someone to nudge someone—this is distracting. It is best to avoid all the methods of this school. is the physically-use-'em school. All of these methods count on physical participation to gain mental attention; this school relies on actual physical use of the student to gain attention and is the closest thing to practical work that can be reached in a lecture. Your use of the men in this manner is dependent on your subject. Perhaps you have a lecture on psychological warfare and want to tell your platoon how neutrals are treated. You pick some inoffensive looking soldier as your neutral and stand him in front of your class. Then you illustrate your major bloc by a group of big sergeants. You make them stomp up and down, flex their muscles, roar out commands to "Come here, you." You physically use them to the fullest extent possible. Then you indicate your minor bloc by pulling out of the class your mildest, slenderest soldiers. Without ridicule you just let them stand there without so much as a peep. Your class and your "neutral" will get the idea much more quickly and effectively than by just saying that neutrals are influenced by the strength of opposing blocs.

The tendency has been to get away from lectures and use practical work where people participate. But the same end can be gotten in lectures if you get everybody into the act.

A Forward Observer Reports from Korea

Lieutenant Ralph D. Harrity

A re-evaluation of the forward observer's job as experienced in a country impeded by mountains and infested by guerrillas

THE time: 1225, 16 July 1950; the place: twelve miles north of Taejon on the Kum river; the unit: Company C, 19th Infantry; the situation: fluid (extremely so). We were almost completely encircled by attacking Communists who had crossed the river on the right flank nine hours before. They had been prevented from overrunning us by artillery and mortar fire which was now non-existent because of severed communications. In my case this amounted to a cut telephone wire and an SCR-610 which could receive but not transmit. The company was engaged in large-scale sniping and mortar action preparatory to making an orderly withdrawal.

The commanding officer gave his final combat order: "Fire and fall back!" Fall back to where? Our main escape route was cut off and every movement was exposed. There was little time left in which to get out. I rolled over the edge of my slit trench, half-rolled, half-ran down a draw from my OP, and swung toward the river and the flats to the left and in front of our adjoining main line of defense. Why we weren't killed by our own troops as we approached their positions is a mystery to me, but apparently the line was falling back at the moment and this action actually saved the few of us who escaped.

What followed for me was anticlimactic: a series of roadblocks; the ditching of the last vehicle convoy attempting to leave the area; and a long trek over the mountains, reaching Taejon the following morning.

This experience convinced me that

we forward observers needed to re-evaluate our jobs to make them fit situations where withdrawal was as common as an attack. We were in a war where methods and procedures in mountain warfare had either to be learned or relearned and where defense against guerrilla tactics was all important. We learned the hard way simply because the job of the forward observer—the spark that generates the whole machinery of artillery—had been somewhat overlooked in recent training.

WHEN first alerted for combat duty, my observer's section contained three men—myself (the observer), a reconnaissance sergeant, and a radio operator-driver. This was quickly modified under combat to include a driver whose sole responsibility was to stay with the vehicle. This was necessary because prolonged operations away from roads and the ever present possibility of enemy guerrilla operations endangered the vehicle and other valuable equipment if left unguarded.

Here's the equipment carried by each man: The observer carried binoculars (preferably M17) and compass M2, dispatch case with map and other small essentials, radio handset, and a box of rations. The recon sergeant carried the SCR-619 or the SCR-610 (the transmitter mounted on separate packboard), binoculars M13, lensatic compass, and a box of rations. The radio operator carried the battery pack of the SCR-610 and extra batteries plus a small stove, or if this was not necessary or available, he carried rations and extra canteens wired to a packboard. We soon learned to travel afoot, allowing freedom of action for the observer.

LIEUTENANT RALPH D. HARRITY, Artillery, has been in Korea since 6 July and has served as a forward observer with a number of American, South Korean and British infantry outfits.

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

There were times when wire communications were available. This added wire and telephone to the burden of the crew. We sometimes added another man to carry a packboard laden with the two DR-8s plus telephone and extra rations. This raised the section's strength to five.

Perhaps the most radical change of equipment affecting the loads was the temporary substitution of the SCR-300 as an artillery contact set. Much easier to carry, the 300 proved its worth in the battle of the Naktong. In event of hasty retreat, of which there were many, more 300 radios came out safely than did 610s or 619s!

The artillery observer must show his infantry unit that they are the boss: that what they say goes. This assures the infantry CO of your absolute cooperation regarding all combat orders.

High casualties among observers in early actions convinced us that the observer and his section had to be placed where they could be protected. On a hill that meant a bivouac near the company CP from which the observer could reach any point on call. On the march it meant walking with the headquarters group. In the attack, depending on the terrain of course, it meant sitting on the hill behind and "watching" the infantry take an objective which was under his complete observation, and then moving forward when the attack was completed. No observer can or should try to work without the protection of a reinforced infantry platoon. This is logical rather than cowardly. Suppose you moved up alone. A sudden, swooping, guerrilla attack would swallow you up, leaving the infantry without artillery support.

Equal in importance to protection is the observer's knowledge of the various escape routes. The infantry CO should map these out when he is consolidating his position. Many infantry and observer casualties could have been prevented in the early days in Korea had such routes been properly reconnoitered and alternates established. Although the term "bug-out" was the Army slang expression for a normal withdrawal, it came to mean for us a somewhat hasty retreat approaching a rout, explained by the terrific odds facing us and the lack of security on our flanks. To minimize casualties a unit faced with this situation must set up a bugout route or



A forward-observer team radios back information from its position on a rocky knob overlooking a wide snow-swept Korean valley.

routes and everyone told about them, the observer included.

I HAVE mentioned the value of the SCR-300 to the observer. If the channels had been doubled for general use artillery-infantry harmony would have been unexcelled. It was during the final phase of the Naktong battle that they proved their real worth. Because of the terrain, the observers sat on the hills behind the attacking infantry and as obstacles were met which could not be clearly defined, the infantry would radio back approximate locations and we were able to spot them and bring necessary fire to bear.

In a holding position, the driver should remain at the infantry battalion or regimental CP. In an attack, he should travel with the vehicles of the unit with which the observer is operating.

Never was the observer's role of sending information regarding front line movements so pressing and necessary as in the early days of the war, particularly after several artillery units were overrun due to lack of information of enemy movements. I can honestly say that at the most critical periods from the Kum River to the final phases of the Naktong, situ-

ation maps at artillery CPs were often more accurate than others simply because of continuous radio contact with the observers.

In order to facilitate news of our own and the enemy's movements and still not risk enemy monitoring, we devised a prearranged phonetic message code. Actual code work proved more trouble than it was worth for answering questions as to *position, front lines, friendly troops at, changing position to*, and so on. This was particularly true when we were withdrawing. It was much easier to call back at a time like that and say, "We're being pushed back. Get off your butt and look for new positions."

The infantry needs properly trained and prepared observers. It must have them to do its own job properly. Once an observer had only a company front to worry about. Now he may well find himself alone in a battalion or even a regimental sector. Thus an observer's training must enable him to eliminate unnecessary casualties or breakdowns under conditions that have existed here in Korea. We may expect to find, in countries of similar terrain and weather and where the inhabitants are trained as guerrillas, that the tactics we have run into in Korea will be repeated.

ALWAYS ANOTHER MOUNTAIN

Lieutenant Arthur H. Kuhlman, Jr.

The platoon hurling itself into the attack swept over the mountain, losing contact with everyone but the enemy. The next day it pulled back--to assault another damned mountain.

NAMES of people, places or towns are not recalled in this episode. It is a story, simply told; one that lives enduringly in the memory of the author. A story born during conflict with the enemy, Germany, high in the mountains of Italy in the spring of 1944.

It was May, but the coming of spring was overshadowed by a seemingly hopeless situation. With anticipation we awaited the warmer weather. But cold, sleety snow or icy rain continued to develop bottomless mire that made all movement miserable and sleep impossible. To the Infantry the gods of war gave no reprieve.

We were not sure which outfits were on our flanks, or even which unit was furnishing us direct support. This may astound a good many infantrymen, but actually it's not uncommon. The date? I'm not sure, but it was sometime around the 21st or 22d, maybe the 23d of May. You see, our division had been on the

move since we broke out of the Gustav Line on the night of 11 May. Mountains, mountains, mountains! Up, down, and around them! They were forever blocking our path. We prayed for a nice, big, juicy valley, but it was always another damned mountain!

OUR battalion had just taken Fondi, the town considered key to the Hitler Line. After Fondi was secured, we were pulled off to one side for some needed sleep. But as customary, we got orders to take another mountain before we had the chance to change our socks. It took us most of the night to get into position to climb the hill, and by that time I knew my men were ready to drop with exhaustion.

But they didn't; together we climbed the mountain. About halfway up we stopped for a break while the company commander questioned a native.

We seldom believed the natives, but this time it was a chance to grab a short rest; and then, who could tell, we might get the truth and some valuable information. We wanted to believe this particular man. He was sure that the *Tedeschi* had left the country hours ago. So we resumed our climb—and it was quiet, too quiet, to suit us. Then it happened.

What seemed like a few riflemen started firing on our single column. Our entire advance halted. Why were we in a single column? Well, during the course of civilization someone had found that the shortest route to the top of the Italian mountains was not a straight line, but a route along the contour lines of the land. Others had followed this route for years and worn a trail to the peak. We found that if we wandered far from these trails we ran into minefields and other assorted troubles. Deployment on the sides of these steep hills was out of the question when time had to be considered. That was the situation, and there we were, pinned down by a few men.

It was doubtful whether my platoon was the target. We were the last platoon in our company and intended for support. I was trying to make my runner understand that he was not to lose contact with the weapons platoon in front of us when I heard a thud behind me which meant that someone had been hit. Lying flat on my face and keeping my steel helmet toward the firing I glanced back along my body and saw that the man behind me had been hit in the arm.

This soldier was slightly deaf and had trouble hearing the whistle of enemy artillery. He would hit the ground only after seeing others do it. The open trail was definitely a bad place to stay. So I called to my runner, told him to break contact up front and get protection from the terrace wall. And I managed to get the man to understand me, and we struggled over the wall ourselves. They couldn't hit us there, but the rest of the company was fully exposed to the fire. I knew we would be moving soon in an attempt to outflank and neutralize it.

IT wasn't long before the CO had sent orders back by word of mouth along the fire-swept trail. He knew we could move, and we were ready

to push off whenever we got the word. It was as we had expected: fire and movement. Advance right up the side of the mountain into an ever-increasing fire. Before long we were at the head of the column and found that the situation had eased enough to permit the CO to send out his lead platoon to help silence the fire. It was at this time that I received the order I was later to regret.

One of the platoon leaders had been hit in the elbow and was to be evacuated whenever possible. His platoon sergeant was to take over the platoon and join ours in a mission to silence the machine guns that had opened fire from a saddle of the mountain. Five guns had been located, but no artillery could be brought to bear on them for several hours. The crest wasn't far away and the high command said to take it by dark. We were to continue to the top of the hill, secure it, then go on to the highway at the base of the mountain on the far side. There we were to wait for further orders. It was simple to say and it seemed simple to do, if we lived through it. I left the CO and returned to my platoon a couple of hundred yards up

the mountain. Outlining my plan of action to the sergeant who had replaced the wounded officer, I dropped him off at his platoon which was directly below mine.

After a little time while I gave the order to my platoon we were set. The designated signal was given precisely at the predetermined time and we began our ascent. To this day I think we must have looked silly to the rest of the outfit. We just stood up and started running toward the machine-gun positions yelling like the devil. We didn't know that we were the only ones moving forward. Neither did we pause to look back. All the other platoons had been notified that the attack had been called off, but the word had not reached us in time. We were primed for battle, and it didn't take us long to silence the machine guns. Then, with no hostile force to contest our passage, over the top of the mountain we went.

It seemed a short distance on the map from the top of that hill to the highway on the other side, but someone had forgotten to figure the height

of that mountain in. When we passed over the crest and the highway came into view, my runner threw away his SCR-536. He knew from past experience that the terrain would block out messages either going out or coming in. Later he cursed himself and I heartily agreed with him. We literally thundered down toward the highway and our objective like the Twentieth Century Limited on a speed run. I thought my lungs would burst. I just couldn't cram enough air in my lungs to offset the exertion and change of altitude. Contact between squads was impossible, and there simply weren't any platoons to contact. But we didn't know about that.

At one point on the descent, we saw some German vehicles about a thousand yards away on the road below us. One of my BAR men threw himself on the ground and began emptying several magazines at the fleeing transports. I watched incredulously as one of the vehicles burst into flame and plunged out of control into a deep ravine. There seemed to be about ten men in the doomed

During the course of civilization someone had found that the shortest route to the top of an Italian mountain was to follow the contour lines.



truck, and the incident stimulated a burst of speed that carried us the rest of the way down to the highway. We gained the edge of the road and then I paused to count my men. From two platoons only eighteen men and myself had survived the advance to our objective. But where were the others? There had been two men on each flank to establish contact. In time I would learn that there was no one on either flank and nothing behind us. We had cut contact with all friendly forces, and were utterly alone.

MORE vehicles were coming down the road and so we prepared for them. We lined the road on either side of the ravine, crouching closely together so that we could achieve the maximum concentration of fire. We had the perfect ambush set up in time to meet the first troop-laden vehicle. I had stationed two men down the road at a point where they could observe and signal the approach of anything within two hundred yards of our position. When they spotted anything coming, they were to signal me and I would alert the rest. I was first man in the ambush, and a burst of my tommy gun was to be the signal for all hell to let loose. We more than made up for our small force with our terrible fire power.

The first truck was almost abreast of my position as I aimed a burst at the cab. I hadn't fired more than three rounds before the rest of the ambush hit them with everything we had. It was gruesome, the firing, the screaming, the confusion. We were primed for it, and we let them have it. Such an ambush may seem cowardly to some, but we were nineteen against odds that we dared not imagine.

WE held that roadblock for what seemed forever. Many vehicles came along and they all got the same treatment, a withering deadly fire. All except one. An ambulance appeared, and in utmost respect we allowed it to pass unharmed. We were accumulating numerous prisoners from the wrecked vehicles, and that meant that more men had to be withdrawn from the ambush to guard them. A patrol sent to the rear to establish contact plus patrols to either flank further diminished our fire power. And the

enemy trucks were coming faster and faster. I was glad when all the patrols came back and bolstered our strength.

My relief was short-lived, however. The patrols reported no Allied units on either flank or in our immediate rear. I was stumped. We had now been in position on the highway for several hours, completely isolated from support. Our only contacts had been with *Tedeschi*. We had over twenty prisoners, some badly wounded, and the enemy dead were rapidly piling up in an area where they had been removed from the road. Wrecked and smoldering vehicles lined the road and ravine, bursting into flames when fed by leaking engine fuel. Darkness was rapidly coming, and the question of what to do was forming in my mind. But the enemy forced the decision at this point and made up my mind for me. Armored cars were coming down the road sweeping both sides with machine-gun fire, swinging their guns in the wide arc of the Hollywood traverse. The first two or three passed without inflicting any casualties, and I ordered a withdrawal back up the mountain we had recently descended.

Some of the prisoners were so badly wounded that I ordered them left by the roadside. We already had more prisoners than we could safely handle. They far outnumbered our small force and I didn't fancy spending the night with that many in our exposed positions. We had withdrawn hardly more than five hundred yards when sounds of activity came from the road. The noise was distant, but it sounded like the steady footfalls of marching troops. From our new location on the mountainside we paused, secure from observation by the friendly cover of darkness. There was no action in the area. Everything was deathly still. I ordered the prisoners, through an interpreter, to lie down on their bellies and place their hands over the back of their heads with their fingers interlocked. I could risk no single sound of betrayal, so I warned them that the slightest sound would bring death to the guilty one and serve as a signal to kill all of them. Everyone was deathly quiet. The booted marching feet crunched over the highway everlastingly, it seemed to us all. A conservative estimate would be at least a battalion. My decision to withdraw had been justified.

THE rest of the night was all a nightmare. Some of the badly wounded prisoners could no longer keep up with us and had to be left by the wayside. We were hopelessly lost on that black mountainside, but I knew that if we kept on climbing we would eventually find a friendly force. If not we could at least return to our starting point. Hour after hour we stumbled and thrashed our way through the sparse growth toward the top of the endless mountain. There was no trail to follow, and in the black night I could make out no terrain features that looked remotely familiar. Our only guide was the faintly visible skyline above us. Something within us fought back the exhaustion and discouragement that tempted us to fold up in sweet relaxation. It kept driving us upward toward our goal. Food and water? We had not stopped long enough to feel the want of it.

We stopped to rest for a brief moment and I almost succumbed to desire for sleep until dawn before continuing to the crest. The men would have welcomed sleep. I was weighing the merits of it when someone up the mountainside called my first name. I thought my ears had deceived me, but the call came again and again. Finally, realizing that the voice from the darkness was real, I answered. It was with indescribable relief that I heard the weapons-platoon leader tell us to stay where we were and wait for him to come to us.

He had been ordered to take his entire platoon in search of us and bring us back. Every last one of us was grateful to them for their action. Rejuvenated by our new good fortune, we reached our destination at the top by daylight. On the return trip we flushed out a machine-gun nest which we had missed the afternoon before, bringing our prisoners with us to the battalion CP. Though tired and exhausted, it had paid to be wary and alert.

We envisioned the sleep that would soon be ours, and the satisfaction of our craving for food. Each of us got one supper unit of K ration. And we were alerted to move out the same morning at 0700 for another advance up another mountain. We ate our food on the run. I don't remember when we slept.

There was always another mountain.

THE PILSEN STORY

Had a combat commander been permitted to make a political decision the course of history might have been changed

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE B. PICKETT & CAPTAIN EDGAR N. MILLINGTON

WHO "liberated" Pilsen in May 1945? Was it the American Red Cross, the 2d Infantry Division, or the 16th Armored Division? All three have received credit for its capture at one time or another. And it wasn't a great victory gained by heavy losses and fought with gallantry either. But for the sake of what it can teach us, the ghost of Pilsen ought to be buried. As most of us know, the average American combat officer of World War II was not noted for his political savvy. Most officers gave less thought to the political significance of their actions than their opposite numbers in armies fighting with or against them.


As we said, little can be learned of a military nature from the Pilsen story. But a lot can be learned about the need for training our troops to operate in conjunction with partisans, revolutionists, and underground groups. That's what makes the Pilsen story worth while.

What happened at Pilsen to the officers and men of the 64th Armored Infantry Battalion (reinforced)—called TF "A" of CCB, 16th Armored Division—could have happened to

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE B. PICKETT, JR., Armor, was commander of Task Force A, 16th Armored Division, at Pilsen and CAPTAIN EDGAR N. MILLINGTON, Infantry, was platoon leader of the machine-gun platoon which routed the German snipers in Prymzl Strasse and participated in the organization of the defense of Cathedral Square.



A cup of fumed Pilsen lager is the reward these 16th Armored cavalrymen got on the day they rolled into the Czech city.



A small corner of the Skoda works in Pilsen. The blasted windows and broken skylights were the work of heavy bombs falling near by.

any other American unit. No doubt other units had similar experiences during this period. The task force attacked, cleared, and guarded the city of Pilsen while the Czechs waged a bloody revolution in Pilsen and Prague. Our forces were permitted by circumstances to assist the revolutionists at Pilsen; however, for various reasons, they did not go into Prague. Consequently the Czech people were ultimately led to believe that American combat units rested in the Pilsen area all day Sunday, 6 May 1945, while the Waffen-SS slaughtered patriots in Prague. This misunderstanding has not fostered good relations between our countries; especially when you add the efforts of a third

nation to propagandize this misunderstanding way out of proportion.

Another part of the Pilsen story is concerned with the cooperation between the liberating American forces and the Czech revolutionists. Our army in the past has not been engaged in extensive antipartisan activities nor has it executed major operations which required close coordination between underground or partisan forces and our regular troops. As you read this story, forget about what outfit liberated Pilsen and concentrate on the lessons that show why our officers need political training. The political picture and the tactical situation were intertwined so this story of Pilsen is told just as it hap-


pened. The political implications are fitted in where they arise.

At the end of April 1945, Third Army's direction of advance was shifted south toward the Danube and Austria. The XII Corps advanced down the Danube to seize Linz, Austria, while XX Corps and III Corps advanced on Salzburg and Berchtesgaden. On 3 May 1945 Third Army assumed control of V Corps which was sent into western Czechoslovakia. A restraining line was established from Karlsbad to a point five miles east of Pilsen to facilitate contact with Soviet units in this area.

On 4 May, the 16th Armored Division assembled at Nürnberg and was attached to V Corps. It was immediately ordered to move to Waidhaus on the old German-Czech border and to pass through any U.S. forces in its path and advance to liberate the city of Pilsen.

THE 16th Armored Division moved in a column of combat commands, Combat Command B leading, to an assembly area in the Waidhaus area. The commanding officer, Combat Command B, ordered the 64th Armored Infantry Battalion to move from Rosshaupt to Bor starting at 2030 hours on 5 May. The Battalion closed into Bor at 2115 that night, taking position in and among the buildings and streets to avoid the gumbo mud in the fields. Some units used barns and stables for parking in order to have firm standing for their heavy vehicles. The reinforced tank battalion of Combat Command B, following the 64th Armored Infantry Battalion, was not so lucky; its assembly area was a sea of mud. Its advance party had failed to estimate the ground conditions and guided the tank battalion into the soggy fields. Many of the vehicles of the battalion bogged down. This had serious consequences during the attack that followed.

The enemy troop units in Pilsen turned out to be a mixture of tactical and administrative units, including fifteen heavy and nine light anti-aircraft batteries, some hundred assorted artillery pieces, the 31st Infantry Regiment and Kampfgruppen from the 2d Panzer Division. In addition there were a number of other Kampfgruppen reported in the area. This brought the German strength to an estimated ten thousand effectives. The most dangerous threat to the



The city of Pilsen showing routes of entry of elements of the 16th Armored Division.

advance of the 16th Armored Division was the 2d Panzer Division.

The 16th Armored Division planned to attack in two columns; Combat Command A down Highway 95 and Combat Command B down Highway 14 at 0600 on 6 May 1945. The line of departure was designated as the front lines of the 97th Infantry Division. A series of check points was designated to coordinate the effort.

THE first determined opposition encountered by the Division was Kozolupy where two German 88s, supported by automatic weapons, opposed the advance. The resistance was easily overcome since the 88s were flak guns in position and were not sited to cover all routes of tank approach in and out of the town. White phosphorus fired into the buildings by the tanks eliminated the sniper fire. During this time a small flank security force consisting of a platoon of Company A, 16th Tank Battalion, and a platoon of Company A, 64th Armored Infantry Battalion—designated Team "Casper"—was dispatched to Pilsen from the southwest. This unit captured 350 PWs at Stod and reduced several roadblocks through the village. Later it reduced a roadblock at Chotesov and entered the outskirts of Pilsen. Meanwhile, Task Force A continued to advance and by 0800 6 May had made contact with the German garrison on

Prymzl Strasse which immediately surrendered. The advance continued into the heart of the city amid thousands of cheering civilians lining the streets, throwing flowers, and offering food and drink.

This greeting was short-lived. It was interrupted by a radio warning from the Task Force commander. Soon small-arms fire opened on the entire length of the column. Most of the fire came from a building on Prymzl Strasse about two blocks west of Cathedral Square. The machine-gun platoon deployed to cover this building and returned the fire and the garrison soon surrendered. The advance continued and at 0830 Cathedral Square was occupied and organized for defense. The square was filled with thousands of cheering Czechs welcoming the Americans as their liberators. But when sniper fire broke out the cheering soon died away. The machine-gun platoon broke up the snipers' game. The battalion command post was established in the city hall at 0845. At 0900 sections of the city were assigned to each of the companies for mop-up operations. Team A was given the mission of blocking the main roads into Pilsen from the east. A small German SS unit attacked the roadblock on Highway 95 but was destroyed in a brief fire fight. The Skoda works were

captured and organized for defense by Company C, 64th Armored Infantry Battalion. During this action a battery of 88mm guns and a platoon of SS troops were captured in the plant yards.

THE underground had come out into the open as soon as the Task Force had reached Cathedral Square. Its appearance in long-hoarded uniforms and armed with all types of weapons was a credit to their national patriotism. Later we learned that the Czech revolt had actually started the night before when the underground attacked the Radio PLZN.

The jubilation of the revolutionists got out of hand on several occasions. The Task Force soon found it had to protect the Germans from the populace—a new and utterly strange duty. Many German units justly refused to surrender until convinced that enough American soldiers were present to protect them from the mob. And once they surrendered their safety was our responsibility. Efforts to cooperate with the underground were extremely difficult. There was the language difficulty. Then the revenge motive which stirred the underground to perform acts that the Americans could not condone. Finally there was the total ab-

sence of fore-planning between the Americans and the revolutionists. Since the Americans had no interpreters, a search was made for English-speaking Czechs. It was amusing at times to see staff officers speaking English to an interpreter, while another officer spoke *French* to Czechs who translated the French back into Czech to their subordinates.

RADIO reports from Prague told of a similar revolt against the Germans. There, however, the Germans were fighting back very determinedly. Tales of the slaughter of revolutionists, rape, massacre, and pillage by the SS at Prague began to flow into Pilsen. The Czechs claimed that the SS tankers were tying children to their tank gun muzzles and crushing them against buildings. Even if only a small part of these tales were true—and there was lots of truth in them—the people of Prague were being given a blood bath by the Germans. Desperate pleas were made to the Task Force commander to go at once to the rescue of Prague. The commanding officer reported all of these stories and their sources to the commander of Combat Command B and to the Division Chief of Staff. But neither was able to take any direct action. The division was alerted for a possible move to Prague and the battalion reconnaissance platoon advanced half way to Prague before being recalled.

Meanwhile, in Pilsen, the German commandant was captured. He requested permission from the executive officer of Combat Command B to say goodbye to his wife. In the process, he committed suicide with a U. S. pistol. His assistant told us that conflicting orders had been issued to the German garrison. Originally the Germans had decided to hold the city at all costs. But after the attack got under way, the Germans decided to surrender to the U. S. forces, but to resist the Czech mobs. Apparently these orders were obeyed by all German units except the 2d Panzer and SS elements. From 0430 to 1800 6 May, Task Force A captured over 4,700 prisoners. The remainder of Combat Command B and all of Combat Command A, 16th Armored Division, closed into Pilsen by 1800 6 May and Task Force A was reassembled in the area around the Pilsen Opera House where it remained,



A GI photographer is drafted as a hero by pretty Pilsen girls.

guarding PWs and manning roadblocks, until VE-day.

THE military action at Pilsen was not of sufficient intensity to draw any major conclusions at battalion or company level. However, the entire operation could have been improved both militarily and politically if a few simple measures had been observed. It seems reasonable to assume that SHAEF was aware of the Czech underground in Pilsen and Prague. Yet no contact seems to have been made with it before the revolt. The Czechs actually planned and executed their revolution of 6 May without any arrangements for coordination with advancing American forces. Obviously a concerted effort between the Czech underground and the American forces could have reduced the confusion and duplication of effort in Pilsen and would have prevented premature action by Czechs in Prague. Obviously the Czech uprising affected

the actions and success of the American forces in Pilsen and radio contact between the two before the attack would have kept each force informed as to the location and situation of the other. Actually several Czech groups were fired on by Americans because the Americans saw groups of men in German helmets and German raincoats approaching their positions carrying "burp" guns. No means of identification had been worked out beforehand.

Another lesson we can learn from the Pilsen story is to weigh the political implications of a military action which destroys valuable property of a friendly nation without a commensurate return. The AAF bombed the famous Skoda works at Pilsen only two weeks before its capture by Army forces. A certain propaganda line was quick to pounce on this and rumors were circulating to the effect that Skoda was bombed so that it could not compete with the "capitalists" in peace-time production. And, amazingly enough, these rumors were rampant as early as 7 and 8 May 1945. If we needed to bomb Skoda that late in the war, a few thousand leaflets explaining why, mixed with the bombs, would have helped counter the false rumors and stories.

The third and deadliest lesson of the Pilsen story is the far-reaching implication to the Czech people of our apparent failure to go to the assistance of their Prague patriots. Prague is the Paris of Czechoslovakia. All roads—political, cultural, historical—lead to Prague. Our failure to go into Prague was a defeat for our side.

ABATTALION commander with over 4,700 PWs to protect from the patriots—and still not injure the patriots' feelings—cannot be expected to give glib-tongued and convincing arguments as to why he halted in Pilsen instead of going to Prague to stop the slaughter. And the division commander—and I suppose it was true on up the chain of command, I know it was true for the Commanding General of the 16th Armored Division—had no choice either.

If we had been briefed on the political problems and had been trained to think in terms of the political significance of our actions, some definite effort at all levels of command could have made the Pilsen story far different. And more to our liking.

CELEBRATIONS

Sniping Is a Specialist's Job

World War II convinced many commanders that snipers could disrupt enemy morale and inflict casualties on officers, noncommissioned officers, crew-served weapons crews, liaison officers, observers and messengers. Thus the sniper's work was far more effective than mere numbers reflect.

T/O&E 7-17N provides one sniper rifle per squad. The M1C is a specialist's tool but in many units it is only a substitute for the M1 and there is little or no specialized sniper training.

But reports from Russian, British, Spanish, Irish, Finnish and Japanese sources tell of their careful regular training of snipers. With the best material available to any army, why do we neglect it?

I heard a regimental commander in Korea speak on the radio. He described the enemy as having superbly trained junior officers and leaders of crew-served weapons units but poorly trained fillers who were simply cannon fodder in their attacks. With a callous disregard for losses, attacks can continue for a long time with such forces if supporting fires continue to be efficient. Sniper units within the numbers and equipment now available, are of great value in any situation. They can operate anywhere an infantry unit can move.

Training of snipers requires selection of high-quality marksmen and elimination of those unfit for the work. A sniper should have perfect eyesight, strong physique, self-confidence and initiative and intelligence. A background of living outdoors and fieldcraft experience is desirable. Basic instruction material is available in FM 21-75. "Sniping: Past and Present," from Volume XXV of the *Infantry School Mailing List* (now *Infantry School Quarterly*) was an excellent help also. There have also been a number of good articles in service publications during the past few years.

If infantry commanders would look

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as \$15.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

into sniping more carefully, they would give it much more emphasis.

Lt. COL. JOHN H. DILLEY
Infantry


Can You Find a Short Quickly?

To find a break in a field wire circuit is simple. Clip on a test phone, ring, and the end of the line which doesn't answer contains the break. By the process of elimination, the break can be located.

But a short is harder to locate. Unless the test phone is clipped onto the line comparatively close to one switchboard or the other, a ring will go to the short and return to the test phone and, likely as not, actuate either switchboard. Which way to go to start looking for the short?

The Communications Department, TAS, teaches the following method which, although not new, doesn't seem to be generally known, judging from spot checks of officers at Fort Sill.

It requires a small amount of



equipment which normally is available to the wireman: a pocket compass of any type, a pair of test clips, and one battery, BA-2 or BA-34.

The test clips are connected to the twisted pair wire line and one lead is attached to one terminal of the battery. The pocket compass is placed to

one side of the test clips between the twisted pair wires. With the other lead of the test clips, make and break contact with the other terminal of the battery. If the needle of the compass is deflected each time the contact is made and broken, the short is on the same side of the test clips as the compass.

As a check, however, it is advisable to move the compass to the other side of the clips and repeat the procedure, since a lack of contact by the test clips, or a very weak battery may not produce a deflection of the needle.

On short lines, the test may be done using the T and BAT positive terminals of a EE-8 telephone (with BA-30s) instead of the batteries.

LIEUTENANT TAS
Artillery

What Tanks Can and Can't Do

From my own observation and a lot of talk I've heard, the World War II infantryman's conception of tanks went something like this:

(a) A big chunk of steel, apparently with men inside, but with whom there is absolutely no way of communicating.

(b) An overpowering roaring noise that attracts artillery fire, and why doesn't it go away?

(c) Five of the above, attached to battalion somewhere, always assigned to another company in an attack, and carrying an inexhaustible supply of ten-in-one rations while we sweat it out on the line with a can of cold meat and beans.

(d) A self-propelled armored smoke-screen that just ran out of ammunition.

(e) An invincible, snorting monster that can do anything—but does nothing.

These suppositions were sometimes so close to the truth that they were hard to dispute. But they weren't exactly so, and a much truer statement can be made.

During World War II, the tank platoon leader immediately began to sweat, the minute he was assigned to a rifle company. In the first place he was outranked, and in the second, the chances are that the rifle company commander had never had any tanks assigned to him before, and so he was liable to get him and his tank platoon killed about as quickly as possible.

Here are some bad examples of

this. One section of tanks, during the Battle of the Bulge, was left in the woods without any covering riflemen. It had the job of covering the withdrawal of a rifle company. If the company commander who ordered it to do that job had been told to leave a section of machine guns to cover the withdrawal of a rifle company he would have hit the ceiling. But he did leave the tanks—mistakenly believing they were invincible. The section got out of it all right, but any confidence they may have had in him as a commander was gone—and never regained.

Another commander, a lieutenant colonel in command of an armored task force, sent a four-tank platoon on a night mission into the enemy lines without infantry. The mission was to check a bridge and find out whether it would carry an armored column. The tank platoon leader tried to argue a bit—as much as a staff sergeant can argue with a lieutenant colonel. He tried to put over the idea of sending a small patrol with an engineer formula which could get the same information. He lost.

These may seem like extreme examples, but they aren't. Both of the commanders mentioned were in the armored infantry, with the advantages of the full two years' training an armored division got in those days.

The tank platoon leader likes to be taken into the company commander's confidence and told the whole picture—and then have the company commander ask him what he can do to help the mission along. But if you keep him in the dark, and then order him to do something impossible, you'll find the cooperation from that platoon so poor from then on it will practically warrant a court-martial.

There are never enough tanks to go around. A battalion is lucky to get one platoon. The battalion commander has to assign it to the company that will need it the most.

You shouldn't divide a platoon of tanks because it works best as a two-section unit, one covering the other. To break it down to one tank for each company is about like issuing shoes to one company, socks to another, and foot powder to another.

Tanks make a lot of noise and they attract artillery fire. There isn't anything you can do about that except dislike it. The engines have to run so that the tank can move around. And

Changing Station?

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Combat Forces Journal
115 17th St., N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

when they aren't running a little one-cylinder job inside the tank is. It runs to keep the battery up. Sure are noisy, aren't they?

Communication with tanks is more or less confined to the preparatory briefing, and from then on to radio. If the briefing is thorough, all you can do after that is watch like a nervous manager in his fighter's corner. You've told him what to do; the rest is up to him. If you can keep radio contact, fine. That isn't any harder than keeping in communication with a committed rifle platoon.

A tank carries a seven-day supply of rations; usually a mixture of different kinds. They're going to be attached somewhere, to somebody who probably doesn't know about it yet, and isn't prepared to feed twenty-five extra men. But, that still doesn't relieve the company commander from the responsibility of feeding them hot chow. But they can get by for a while in case he can't or doesn't.

The last misconception could be discussed for hours, but we can break it down in a hurry.

Tanks are *not* invincible. Mines blow off their tracks. Armor-piercing rounds go in one side and out the other. Molotov cocktails set them on fire. Bazooka shells penetrate them and kill the men inside. And they sink out of sight on soft ground.

Well then, what *can* they do?

They can knock out machine guns, cut down opposing infantry, make with a non-persistent screening smoke, give excellent covering fire, and create havoc in a small town. They also raise fear in opposing forces, and they have been known to use crushing power on men who couldn't run faster than twenty-four miles per hour. The secondary mission of a tank platoon is to supplement artillery fire. And they never get that mission as often as they should.

The rest? That's up to the artillery and the infantry.

T/SGT. CHARLES WILLEFORD

You and Your Army

(Continued from page 11)

and when we can't find what we want we may be irked enough to say so out loud. We will also say so when we do.

Association ROTC Medals

IN 1936, the United States Field Artillery Association established the fine custom of awarding medals to the outstanding ROTC cadets in each senior Field Artillery ROTC unit. In the intervening years, these awards have developed a splendid tradition that has played a major role in ROTC graduating ceremonies.

The Association of the United States Army is continuing this custom and is creating a new medal for award to the outstanding Infantry cadets in the senior ROTC Infantry units throughout the country. We are convinced that these awards make a real contribution to the recognition of outstanding achievements in ROTC training and at the same time fulfill one of the primary objectives of our association; namely, "to promote the efficiency of the Army."

The Artillery Medal has been changed a little. The medal is a bronze replica of the Palma Vecchio portrait of Saint Barbara, patroness of artillery, overset on the familiar artillery cannons. With the exception of the association name, this is a replica of the old Field Artillery Association seal. The wording on the face of the medal has been changed to read, "Association of the U. S. Army—Artillery ROTC." The medal is attached to the breast clasp by a high-quality grosgrain, artillery-red ribbon. The reverse side of both medals is blank and is suitable for engraving the name of the cadet, date of award as well as the college name.

Before striking a medal for award to the Infantry ROTC cadets, we considered numerous designs. It was the consensus, however, that a bronze replica of the old Infantry Association seal, with the traditional crossed muskets that identify that branch, would be most suitable. The wording on the face of the Infantry medal is identical with that of the artillery medal except that the word *infantry* has been substituted for *artillery*. The grosgrain ribbon attaching the medal to the breast-clasp is *infantry blue*.

World Perimeters

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza

General Situation

THE fear of war throughout the world is not over boundaries, colonies, or economic differences. It is a clash of ideals. Wars between ideals are not new. There were the religious wars: pagans vs. Christians, Christians vs. Mohammedans, Catholics vs. Protestants. These wars were bitter and savage. Today the hatred in this country against Communism surpasses our hatred of Nazism and Fascism. The resultant fighting may surpass in intensity and destruction any former wars. Wars over ideals have in the past lasted off and on for centuries; the next war may be as long.

Four thousand years of recorded history indicate that no ideal has been destroyed by war. There are great nations, and hundreds of millions of peoples who are pagan, Christian and Mohammedan. Communism is a new and a young ideal. It is hardly a century old. Like Christianity and Mohammedism when they were the same age, Communism is militant, "rarin' to go." It is concentrating first against the Christian nations as the most powerful ideal confronting it. Ideals thrive despite wars and persecutions. It is highly improbable that either Christians or Communists will destroy the other. States may disappear but the ideals persist. The possibility of peace between Christianity and Communism is not very good.

Soviet Union

RUSSIA is the leader of Communism. It has nine satellite states in East Europe, plus China in Asia. The European satellites are Christian nations and opposed to Communism. They are held by force and are undergoing frequent purges to eliminate religious

and anti-Communist elements. They can not be counted upon to actively aid Russia but may be forced to do so to a limited extent.

China's union with Russia has been brought about by its rulers, who happen to be Communists. Most Chinese are pagans, but in general they have lost faith in all religions. They neither favor, nor oppose, Communism. The association with Russia is accidental. It may fall apart if circumstances develop which might effect a change of rulers. The British Government seems to hope that the present Chinese rulers, if not antagonized, may ultimately turn against Russia. This is unlikely, but it might be possible to substitute at some future time new rulers for China who would be friendly to the United States and its Allies. The Soviet Union is aware of that possibility; hence it is insisting on the destruction of the anti-Communist Chinese Government functioning on Formosa. Communist Russia and China do not desire so much possession of the island of Formosa as the suppression of the major existing Chinese force opposed to the Communists who have seized control at Peiping. It is a thorn in their sides.

As a pagan China's natural position in a conflict between Christian and Communist ideals would be to remain neutral. This is the position of India and Southeast Asia. They do not want war, will take no part in it. Russia is engaged in spreading Communism to Indochina, where a serious war is in progress. Force may be used against both India and Southeast Asia to spread Communism. This is likely to be a gradual development. Chinese Communist troops have already appeared on the borders of Assam and Burma, at opposite ends of the famous Stilwell Road. Sinkiang has been partly occupied by Russian

troops and Tibet by Chinese Communists. Air routes through these great provinces are being opened. It may not be long before India is endangered.

Southwest Asia is the home of Mohammedan peoples. Communism is opposed to Mohammedism. The Mohammedans know it; but they do not overlook the fact that for centuries they have considered the Christians as the Infidels. The Mohammedan nations are not particularly interested in a war between Christians and Communists, but they fear being drawn into it. They are all weak, unable to defend the vast oil fields within their territories. Since Russia is supposed to need more oil, an attack by Russia is considered possible, and by many as probable. Political restlessness, low standards of life, small military forces inadequately equipped and trained, and a serious refugee problem in the Levant area make Southwest Asia particularly vulnerable to attack.

Russian Intentions. Russia seeks to spread Communism throughout the world in a step-by-step advance. According to circumstances, and in order of preference, this is to be accomplished by peaceful penetration, by interior revolts, or by war.

On 21 January at Moscow, the head of the Soviet Union's Ideological Section delivered a speech before Marshal Stalin and the most distinguished Soviet leaders. It was the annual keynote speech outlining future intentions. It was a bitter attack against the United States. It charged that the United States in 1919 and 1920 had sought to conquer Siberia and had failed. It would similarly fail in its current plan to annex Korea. The United States was following the example of Hitler. It would meet the same fate. In fact Lenin had predicted that this was just what was going to happen.

On 29 January, the Soviet press, aroused over news that the Eighth Army in Korea had gone over to the offensive, commenced a vicious attack against the United States. The U.S., it was charged, was using Japan as a military base for imperialistic purposes. It was attacking China. China had advised that a separate peace treaty between Japan and the United States meant war. In view of the formal alliance existing between the Soviet Union and China it would seem that the Soviet Union would join China in the war.

On 14 February, the Soviet press charged that the United States was racing toward World War III, if it made peace with Japan. The alliance with China had as its basic mission the prevention of aggression by Japan "or any other state, which directly or indirectly, may unite with Japan in acts of aggression." The United States was identified as *the other state*. On the same date the Soviet representative on the Allied Council at Tokyo charged the United States with rearming Japan in violation of the Potsdam Agreement.

Two days later Marshal Stalin gave his "interview." He gave no indication of his policy in Europe and did not mention Germany. He made certain pronouncements as to Korea: "If Britain and the United States reject the proposals made by the People's Government of China the war in Korea can only end in the defeat of interventionists"—the U.S.

The State Department's *Voice of America* broadcast has said that Russia was shipping arms and munitions through Manchuria to North Korea in large quantities at least as early as April, 1950, and was equipping Chinese divisions (as previously reported in this column). The invasion of South Korea must be presumed to have been planned by the Soviet Union. The original proclamation indicated that the conquest of South Korea was expected to be completed during August, with elections following in September. This hope failing, the intervention by Chinese troops came.

Does Stalin's claim of 16 February that unless China's terms are accepted the defeat of the American forces will follow, mean that if the Chinese intervention fails, that the Soviet Union will in turn intervene? No one can know. Intervention need not necessarily involve Soviet troops; it might be by Russian-equipped Chinese forces.

Proposed Conference of Foreign Ministers. On 22 January the Western Powers advised Russia that they were willing to accept its proposition of 3 November 1950, for a conference to discuss the rearming of Germany, provided that the conference would also discuss all other important matters of difference between them and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union replied on 5 February that rearming Germany was the

problem of prime importance. It was well aware of General Eisenhower's conversations with the West German Government concerning German contributions to the defense of Europe. All this, the Soviet Union now held, did not jibe with U.S. statements that it desired peace. Moreover, the strength of armies and armaments in West Europe and in the United States had taken unheard of proportions and caused increased international tension and disquiet. The Soviet Union considered this situation intolerable and for that reason proposed a conference of Foreign Ministers. She had no objection to discussing problems other than Germany.

The correspondence about this conference was characterized by a bitterness which is remarkable. Russia accused the West of slander and lies, and of preparing a war. Stalin's interview of 16 February represented the North Atlantic Allies as craving for war to make profits for the American "billionaires and millionaires." Its twelve members, plus twenty Latin American nations, alleged to be American satellites, had a majority of votes in the United Nations, which had become a body controlled by the U.S., Stalin said. In fact the thirty-two nations referred to are Christian and anti-Communist. On its side the West has accused the Soviet Union of disregarding treaties, making false official statements and actively attacking them by wars in Greece, in Korea and in Indochina.

In view of the mutual distrust and dislike between Russia and the West it is improbable that any conference of Foreign Ministers will do more than postpone a final show down.

Soviet Production. As part of the Cold War the United States has made efforts to prevent war materials from reaching Russia and its satellites, including China. Substantial, but not complete, success has been attained. Swiss intelligence reports show that as of 1 February, Russia was feeling the effects of this economic blockade. It was short of aluminum, cobalt, copper, lead, nickel and steel. A large part of its production of ordnance came from East Germany. Electric power was less than needed for current needs.

The fact that Russian industrial production is much below that of the United States should not lead to an assumption that Russia would be unable to maintain a prolonged war

with the West. The determining factor is not *total* production, but *production available for military purposes*. Example: United States steel production is around 100 million tons per annum, but in the past few years not over seven million tons have been annually used by defense forces. Accurate Russian figures are not available, but its total steel production has been about forty-five million tons per annum, of which twenty million tons are reported as used by military services. Similar comparisons could be made regarding other key industries. No assumption should be made that Russia can not wage a long war. That same assumption was erroneously made in 1939 regarding Germany. Notwithstanding lesser total production Russia appears on certain lines to be producing more war matériel than the United States.

The Balkans

ON 15 February, the British Government made an official announcement in the House of Commons. "Any threat to Yugoslavia is of concern to His Majesty's Government, and we are in touch on this with other governments."

Next day Marshal Tito at Belgrade stated that it would be impracticable to confine a war locally to the Balkans. He had entered into a plan, a strong one, covering aggression anywhere in Europe. He had made all possible preparations, including plans against a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia or advance into North Italy.

As previously discussed in this column, strong Soviet forces have been assembled for more than a year near Lake Balaton in Hungary. From that position, they could attack west into Italy, or south into Yugoslavia, or turn the south flank of a West European Army into Germany. The Yugoslav army of thirty divisions is the largest in Europe outside of Russia and would, if free to act, be a powerful deterrent to a Russian army seeking to advance beyond Hungary. Yugoslavia is however handicapped by the shape of her frontier with the Communist states. Forces in Romania, Bulgaria and Albania threaten her from the east and south. What Yugoslavia could accomplish against this combination is unknown. When in 1941 Yugoslavia was attacked simultaneously from the north and east it collapsed within ten days. It is to be hoped that Marshal Tito's new plan provides for

taking advantage of his central position and defeating attacking columns successively and before they can unite. This is not impossible, but would require high mobility, good transportation, and an able high command.

The Hungarian Army has been reorganized. The corps and army headquarters have been demobilized. Hungarian regiments in Hungary are incorporated into the Red Army. Three Hungarian regiments of infantry have been exchanged for Russian regiments; the Hungarians have been reported in line opposite Iran, where Polish organizations were previously reported. It is probable that Russia rates Hungarian troops as unreliable for a war in the west, and this is probably a correct rating.

The Balkans are a second possible area against which Communist aggression may appear.

North Atlantic Alliance

ON 16 January, General Eisenhower in London stated that the rearming of Germany was a political problem. Four days later, then in Germany, he invited Germany to rearm, "on exactly the same status as all [members of the North Atlantic Alliance]." Germany has not been very responsive to invitations to rearm and has made it plain that it will be reluctant until independence is restored. It sees no advantage in taking part in a new war if its status as a prisoner state is to be continued.

On 5 February the United States received authority from France to occupy, improve and maintain five air bases in Morocco. First transports bearing ground crews and matériel arrived a few days later and the bases should be operational by the coming summer. These bases will be beyond the probable range of enemy operations at least at the commencement of a new war, and thereby comply with strategic principles as to having bases safe from sudden enemy seizure. The Soviet Union knows about this, and has taken special action. It has for long maintained large consular staffs in North Africa, from which its secret agents operate. Their mission is to induce the Arab population to revolt against French occupation and French Allies. During February the Sultan of Morocco's Government showed some sympathy with subversive elements. France is aware of this Soviet activity and is taking steps to counteract it.

APRIL, 1951



ARMY

Combat Badges

Combat infantrymen and medics who earned the Combat Infantryman or Medical Badge in World War II and are now in Korea may add a silver star to their badge, the Army announced. The new badges are substantially the same as the former ones except that a silver star to the wreaths has been added to each.

To earn the stars the World War II veteran must be a member of an infantry unit which is in combat and perform the duties required by regulations for original award of the badge.

Light Division

General Collins revealed that the Army is considering the creation of a light division which might be useful in poorly-roaded and mountainous country such as that in Korea.

Details of numbers and types of equipment in the division were not discussed by the Army Chief of Staff. He did observe, however, that the standard division is basically sound. In World War II several light and motorized divisions were formed but most of them were changed to standard infantry divisions before going into combat. General Lesley J. McNair held that special-type divisions were wasteful of manpower and that it was more economical in manpower to have standard divisions shuck off heavy parts when light operations became necessary.

Maneuvers

The big summer maneuvers of 1951 are scheduled for the Fort Bragg, N. C., area from 20 June to 10 July. To be known as Exercise Southern Pine, the maneuvers will stress Army-Air Force coordination. Army units to participate have not been announced but in all likelihood they will include airborne units and other elements. Air Force units will include fighter-bomber, troop-carrier and light bomber squadrons.

Exercise Timberline in the Colorado Rockies, vicinity of Camp Carson, is the other summer exercise. It

will involve a regimental combat team and supporting service units supported by fighter-bomber and troop-carrier units. It will be conducted at the same time as Exercise Southern Pine.

Combat Pay

The combat pay bill introduced in Congress is resting so quietly that fears that it will never get action may be well founded. The important troops-to-Europe and manpower measures are time-consuming and whether the committees get to the combat pay bill is problematical. The facts of combat in Korea, as in World War II, speak loudly for its enactment but there are those who are against it. The editors of this magazine hope that open hearings will be conducted and that those who oppose it will give their reasons openly and frankly. We would like to see what they are.

INFANTRY

Boom

The boom is on at the Infantry School and authorities are hard pressed to find instructors, equipment and space for the thousands of infantrymen who will crowd the school during the next several months. In February the number of students reporting to the School were numbered in the thousands. Many of these were airborne trainees.

Special orientation classes are conducted along with the regular officer and enlisted classes. One special course—in instructional methods—has combat wounded from Korea as its students. Here they learn how to teach and transmit their own combat experiences to the officers and men they will instruct at schools, divisions and training centers.

Training Tests

The School is at work putting into final form the following Army Field Forces Training Tests:

Regimental Headquarters Company—separate test for each of the platoons

Heavy Mortar Company—platoon and squad tests

Headquarters Company, Infantry Battalion—Communication Pla-

toon and Pioneer and Ammunition Platoon tests
Rifle Company—Platoon and squad tests

Heavy Weapons Company—Combat firing tests for the Machine Gun Platoon, 81mm Mortar Platoon, and 75mm Rifle Platoon
Tank Company, Infantry Regiment
Tank Platoon—combat firing
I&R Platoon, Airborne Infantry Regiment

Support Company, Airborne Infantry Regiment
Antitank Platoon of the Support Company, Airborne Infantry Regiment

These manuals received final approval of Army Field Forces and went to the printer:

FM 7-17—Armored Infantry Company and Battalion

FM 23-90—81mm Mortar, M1

FM 23-92—4.2-inch Chemical Mortar

TC—Aerial Delivery of Arms and Equipment

FM 26-5—Interior Guard Duty has been printed and distributed.

Extension Courses

There's an upward trend in enrollments in extension courses. More than 6,450 persons are enrolled and student activity has also increased. This means more lessons to be graded.

An increase of 302 in the number of enrollments in two map reading subcourses was noted after the Army Field Forces published the letter concerning map and aerial photograph proficiency.

Since publication of the regulation permitting graduates of the 10 series to continue in the 20 series, 101 enlisted men have enrolled in the 20-series.

ARTILLERY

OCS Under Way

The Artillery School's first Officer Candidate School since World War II got off to a running start 26 February when 57 students reported to initial classes. It will be 22 weeks before the first graduates become qualified as second lieutenants of Artillery.

Keeping pace with the expansion of the Army, new classes will be started each month until six classes are receiving training simultaneously. Each class will have an authorized strength of 115 candidates.

The program requires 970 hours of instruction. Officers and NCOs of the

OCS staff give 141 hours of instruction in drill and command, physical training, individual weapons training, chemical warfare, sanitation and first aid, and officer indoctrination.

Technical training given by departments of TAS is presented in "block" form. Hours of instruction by each department: Gunnery 304, Combined Arms 124, Motors 94, Matériel 69, Communications 72, Observation 36, Airborne and Special Operations 21, General Subjects 107, and Air Training 2.

The Marines Land

Twenty-three Marine officers have been assigned to the staff and faculty, TAS, as instructors in the Departments of Airborne and Special Operations, Combined Arms, Communication, General Subjects, Observation, and Gunnery.

In the near future, it is expected that five Marine enlisted instructors will be assigned to the Department of Observation, and an additional five Marine officers will be assigned to the Department of Gunnery.

The Marines are stationed at TAS to shoulder part of the instructional load that results from the increasing number of Marine students in various artillery courses. Currently, Marines are enrolled in the following courses: Survey and Intelligence, Associated Advanced Course classes at Fort Sill. Battery Officers' course, Countermortar, Radar, Sound and Flash, Survey, and Meteorology.

Approximately 187 marines are currently attending courses at TAS.

Amphibious Training

A 20-hour course of instruction in Amphibious Operations was presented to the Artillery Officers' Advanced Course at Fort Bliss, during the second week in March. The course duplicated the instruction given to the Advanced Course classes at Fort Sill. It was presented by a team from the Department of Airborne and Special Operations, TAS, Fort Sill.

The instruction covered the organization of amphibious forces, landing craft and vessels, naval gunfire, air and artillery support of an amphibious operation, coordination of the supporting arms in amphibious operations, and a practical exercise in loading a landing ship.

The course is of particular interest to artillerymen since it stresses the support provided by air, artillery and naval gunfire.

Management Instruction

The first "guinea-pig" students were very favorably impressed with the new course in Business Management which has been included in the program of instruction of the Department of General Subjects, TAS, for the 1950-51 Advanced Officers' Course. Greater economy and efficiency can be obtained at all echelons of command by more effective use of manpower, equipment, and time available to the commander, and this course is designed to promote those ends. The instruction points out that certain principles used by successful leaders in business and industry are equally applicable to military units. Reduced to their simplest form, these principles are:

- (1) Plan objectives carefully and be sure they are understood by all concerned.

- (2) Maintain up-to-date, well organized, written SOPs.

- (3) Set and maintain performance standards.

- (4) Balance duties, functions and responsibilities through definite organization.

- (5) Employ each man fully in the job he does best.

- (6) Use all material resources to the best advantage.

- (7) Continuously appraise the results being obtained.

- (8) Constantly strive for improvement.

Close Air Support

The 185th Fighter Squadron, Oklahoma Air National Guard, is providing close air support for several of the field exercises presented by the Department of Combined Arms, TAS. The Squadron is stationed at Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma City.

New Artillery Plane

The Department of Air Training, TAS, is receiving some L-19 Army aircraft from Cessna. This all-metal plane has been designed to replace the old L-4s and L-5s as the artillery observation plane. The spring-steel landing gear is a simple and efficient innovation which is incorporated into the new L-19.

Air Tactics

Starting 12 February, the Department of Air Training, TAS, initiated overlapping courses in Army aviation tactics. Courses now start every seven weeks. Sixty-four National Guard officers began the first overlapping class.

It is contemplated that all NG divisional Army aviators will be given an opportunity to go through a refresher course in tactics.

New Radar Text

Recently published is Special Text 6-150-1, entitled *Employment of Tracking-type Radar with Field Artillery*. Early publication of the same text in the form of a D/A training circular is anticipated.

The text supersedes *FA Radar Notes*, 1949, and covers all aspects of radar in the field artillery. Among the items discussed are: radar principles, organization and equipment, position area requirements, weapon location, conduct of fire, communication, and tactical employment.

Survey Training Film

The new training film, "Artillery Survey," is rapidly approaching completion. At present all of the live scenes have been filmed and the animated scenes are nearly complete. The final stage is to combine the live and animated scenes into the complete story and to record the necessary sound effects and narration.

The film depicts an artillery battalion survey party in the execution of a grid sheet survey. Personnel of the 631st FA Bn, TAS, were used for all the live scenes. The various methods of survey are depicted by animation.

Corps Artillery Course

Selected officers now assigned or currently being considered for corps and army artillery assignments are just completing a special one-week course at TAS designed to train them in the latest doctrines in the employment of corps and army artillery units.

Map Term Changes

The recent adoption of the military grid reference system has caused some changes in terms which have been used in the Army for many years to describe map locations and directions. The X and Y coordinates are now called Easting (E) and Northing (N), respectively. Instead of Y-Azimuth or Y-North, the terms Grid Azimuth and Grid North are used.

Instructor Team Training

National Guard instructor teams recently were given a 72-hour course of instruction by the Department of Matériel, TAS. The teams came from

NG divisions which have been ordered into active military service.

The teams, consisting of both officers and enlisted men, were given instruction in the characteristics, maintenance, functioning, malfunctions, and inspection procedures of 105mm and 155mm howitzers; 2.36" and 3.5" rocket launchers; carbine, cal. .30, M2; pistol, cal. .45; cal. .50 machine gun; artillery ammunition, fuzes, and boosters; and the duties of the artillery mechanic.

Big Shoot

General officers and key staff members from the National Guard divisions now in the active military service recently observed a demonstration of massed artillery fire at TAS. The Department of Gunnery staged the demonstration.

The purpose of the spectacle was to show the impressive amount of artillery fire power that is available to a division commander within his own organization, and from corps artillery.

The visitors saw the fire of five battalions massed on various targets, the final event being a time-on-target mission in which the fire of the five battalions fell on a single target at the same instant.

This demonstration may be given periodically in the future as part of the instruction offered at TAS.

British Liaison Instruction

A series of four conferences entitled, "The Military Potential and Resources of the British Commonwealth," "The Armed Forces of Great Britain," "The British Arms, Services, and the Staff," and "British Artillery" were presented to the Advanced Class during the month of March by the British liaison officer to TAS, Lt. Col. L. P. Cocks.

Extension Course News

New Directory. Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-100, *Announcement of Army Extension Courses*, has recently been published. It includes some changes in the Extension Courses program of TAS. Some of the courses, previously optional, have been made required courses and vice versa.

Extracts of the pamphlet showing the changes are available upon request from the Extension Courses Branch, Division of Training Publications, TAS, Fort Sill, Okla.

New Record. The Artillery School established a new record during the

month of January 1951 by grading 9,780 Extension Courses lessons. During January 1950, 8,230 lessons were graded. The increase has been steady since late last summer.

New Courses. The newest subcourse of AEC published by TAS is Subcourse 20-9, *Firing Battery*. This subcourse is a revision which incorporates the target grid procedure. It is part of the Special Field Artillery Gunnery series and is expected to be received from the printer about 1 April. Two optional subcourses for I&E specialists and unit commanders have been added to the extension courses program of TAS. They are: Subcourse 30-22, *Troop Information and Education Program-I*, and 40-27, *Troop Information and Education Program-II*. Both courses are currently available. The preparation of Subcourse 40-28, *Air Transportability*, is well under way at the Extension Courses Branch at TAS. The new subcourse, which is expected to be in administration next fall, will cover transportability from the troop standpoint.

Reservists Note. Reservists who anticipate needing retirement points prior to the end of the retirement year (30 June for most reservists), should take the necessary action to complete their lessons before the deadline. Many letters have been received by the Extension Courses Branch, TAS, from reservists in Korea, Alaska, and other distant stations, asking for waivers of minimum requirements until situations quieted down a little. Such waivers and extensions are cheerfully granted.

Artillery Guide

During recent months, the JOURNAL has received a number of requests for copies of the *Field Artillery Guide*, used by thousands of artillerymen during World War II. The *Guide* has been out of print for several years now. A new and up-to-date edition would be a major project. Much of the material in the old editions is obsolete and, of course, a wealth of new material has become available. The editorial staff of the JOURNAL has been studying a possible revision and is in the process of gathering material for it in the event that publication is desirable.

Suggestions from the field as to content would be of great help as would an indication of the desirability of publishing a new edition.

BOOK REVIEW

For Staff and Command

THE WAR DEPARTMENT. CHIEF OF STAFF: PREWAR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS. By Mark S. Watson. Office of Military History, Department of the Army. 551 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75.

Seekers of bargains in military books will seldom encounter a better deal than this one. Here is a splendid, carefully compiled staff history, running over 500 pages and selling for less than four dollars. It belongs in the library of every student of World War II, because it is only from the high elevation of the Office of the Chief of Staff that the whole picture of the defense effort in the years prior to and after Pearl Harbor can be seen and evaluated. This is the first of two volumes and it covers the activities of the Chief of Staff up to 7 December 1941. Mr. Watson and his associates in the Office of Military History are to be congratulated on the thoroughness and objectivity of their work on this volume.

Though some attention is given to the men who served as Chief of Staff from 1919-39, the central figure of this volume is General George C. Marshall, who held that post from the day on which Hitler invaded Poland to 14 November 1945. Marshall inherited the defective staff machinery which Congressional action imposed on his predecessors. No other figure in our military history so definitely influenced the military planning, the preparation for, and the later conduct of war. That a man charged with such manifold responsibilities, working under the legal restraints imposed on him, made an occasional mistake is understandably human. The miracle was that he made so few. The Chief of Staff was supposed to do more things than any one man could do well. He was charged with the planning, administration, training, armament, and supply of the Army. He had to "sell" his military program to the legislative and executive branches of the government. Because the Navy seemed only mildly interested in the matter, it was he who had to achieve a measure of cooperation between the services, and later on, with our prospective allies.

Many of the restrictions and handicaps under which the Chief of Staff functioned in the prewar years stemmed from Congressional fears of setting up a hotbed of "militarism" in the General Staff. How absurd these fears were is made clear in

these pages. No one could set up much of anything on the pitiful appropriations allowed the Chiefs of Staff in the prewar years by the Directors of the Budget and the Presidents above them. General Marshall's transparent honesty and patient education of Congressmen through repeated hearings before their committees ultimately won their wholehearted confidence. Mr. Watson believes that it was largely on account of this confidence that the War Department was spared an immediate Congressional investigation after Pearl Harbor and the loss of the Philippines. General Marshall had so carefully briefed the Congress on the problems and plans of the War Department that the men who had been working night and day to get the Nation ready for war were allowed to conduct it without an immediate crippling investigation of past mistakes.

Mr. Watson's account provides a much-needed corrective to the assumption that the limited funds asked for by Chiefs of Staff in the years before the war reflected their blindness to the military needs facing the country. He plainly shows that it was the President and the Director of the Budget who set the upper limits to War Department requests. All that remained for the Chief of Staff to do was formulate the best program he could within these limits. It was even contrary to law for the Staff to go beyond these limits in their budgetary presentations to Congress. At this particular time, when the interests of our people are concerned with the powers of the President as Commander in Chief, it is pertinent to point out that President Roosevelt sometimes made the job of his military advisers still more difficult by intervening directly on the level of military planning. Thus he demanded the production of ten thousand planes after Munich in 1938 without much regard for their relation to a balanced military program. Again, shortly before Pearl Harbor, he attempted to reduce the size of the Army in training.

If General Marshall had more things to do than any man could handle effectively with the defective staff machinery existing before the war, this book makes it clear that he made a remarkable effort to accomplish them. The direct effects of his personal intervention in the affairs and decision of the staff are evident on many pages. He laid the foundations of our military effort on such a sure basis that despite the initial handicaps and

the disasters we suffered in the early phases of the war, victory came with majestic inevitability in the later stages.


This volume provides the general reader with the first documented information available to him on many important matters and subjects. It gives a full treatment to the military aid offered to Britain and its relation to our own war effort. It provides the story of the extension of greater autonomy to the Air Force and the growing appreciation of its role in modern war by the General Staff. It gives hitherto unavailable material on the defense status of the Philippines under General MacArthur and his optimism regarding it. An account is provided of the development of the so-called "Victory Program" drawn up by the War Plans Division in the late summer of 1941 at the President's request to estimate the requirements necessary to defeat the Axis. The author indicates in a footnote the conclusions which the German intelligence system drew from the disclosures of this program which were printed in the *Chicago Tribune* on 4 December 1941. Our efforts to provide an adequate defense of Panama, Hawaii and the Philippines in the face of growing indications of Japanese aggressive actions are treated at length.

General Marshall and the War Department General Staff watched the increasing tension between Japan and the United States with great anxiety. They alone knew how unprepared the democracies were for a war in the Far East. Though frantic efforts were made to increase the defenses of our outlying establishments, war came in the form of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor before these efforts were effective.

Reader interest may center on Mr. Watson's account of the Pearl Harbor surprise and his estimation of the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for that disaster. That the author is not trying to whitewash the staff is indicated by his summary of the "mischances" which made Pearl Harbor such a tragic setback to the whole allied war effort. His conclusions run something like this: (1) The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was as big a surprise to the high command in Washington as it was to the local commanders in Hawaii. (2) A good deal of the intelligence information in Washington (particularly the "Magic" intercepts) was not decoded in time, and some of what was decoded was improperly appraised. (3) The General Staff did not share all the highly relevant information in its hands with General Short. (4) The Hawaiian command was provided with enough information and sufficient warnings to permit the staff to expect that, like San Francisco and Panama, it would be alert to its own peril. (5) The forces in Hawaii were too small to carry out both training and reconnaissance. (6) Little attention

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
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OFF-DUTY READING

SOVIET ABSOLUTES—MIND AND MATTER

AS important to the American military man as the state of training and size of the Red Army—perhaps more important—is the state of the Soviet economy. It is perfectly true that not more than a handful of men—none of them outside Russia—know precisely and accurately the state of the Soviet economy. It is also true that a trained statistician-economist of wide knowledge and limitless patience can—by analyzing published Russian statistics, by comparing them with other studies and analyses known to be accurate and with the probable and possible in the field of economics—come very close to the truth. Mr. Harry Schwartz of Syracuse University has done precisely this in *Russia's Soviet Economy* (Prentice-Hall, \$6.65), a splendid, entirely unemotional study of Russia's economy in terms of historical perspective and current development, of productive method and the results of that method.

SIR Duff Cooper, biographer of Talleyrand and Haig and more recently author of the excellent *Sergeant Shakespeare* (Viking, \$2.50) has just written his first novel, *Operation Heartbreak* (also Viking, \$2.50). He has gotten brilliantly into a very short book the story of Willie Maryngton who wanted nothing more out of life than to go into battle with his regiment—and was just too young for active service in World War I and too old to see combat in World War II. How Willie Maryngton finally went on a perilous mission of great importance is the snapper—a great ending to a warmly, sympathetically told story of the man who is always with us in life, the cheerful, likeable fellow who never quite does anything right.

World So Wide (Random House, \$3.50), the last novel Sinclair Lewis finished before he died, is a return, in a way to *Main Street* and *Dodsworth*, Mr. Lewis having taken some remarkable likenesses of the people in them and sent them touring to postwar Rome and Venice and Florence seeking culture. Here and there are splendid passages of satire—on Americans abroad, and on Europe today—but the characters and their author seem for the most part a little tired and bewildered, as if they had lost their way into an era they neither understood nor were a part of. I think they have.

ANOTHER major novelist, Arthur Koestler, has just published *The Age of Longing* (Macmillan, \$3.50), a novel as good in some ways as his great *Darkness at Noon*. His new novel is set in Paris three or four years from now, a time when the Russians have taken over the rest of Europe and can obviously move in on France at their leisure. Koestler's central character here is Nikitin, a rather high Communist official of the new generation—one whose roots do not go back to the Revolution—whose faith in himself and in the government he represents is deep and strong. Hydie, divorced daughter of an American officer, is attracted to him chiefly because she has faith in nothing, because his faith in an Absolute represents strength to her, fills the vacuum that her own loss of faith has left. Except for Hydie, Koestler's characterizations are fine and perceptive. She, however, appears to be a convenient symbol he uses to develop his characterization of Nikitin, rather than a person. This is the only major flaw in a powerful, somber novel that sees us as we may be if we surrender to the weakness that is in some degree in all of us—the wish to believe in an Absolute and to surrender our wills to its prophets.

COLD SWEAT DEPARTMENT: Hammond Innes, one of the masters of the suspense novel, is back with *The Angry Mountain* (Harper, \$2.75). The angry mountain is Vesuvius during its most recent eruption, and the plot a chase that begins behind the Iron Curtain and ends, after almost unbearable tension, in the shadow of Vesuvius. Magnificent.

For a chaser, I'd recommend *The Vicious Circle* (Rinehart, \$3.00), Margaret Case Harriman's reminiscences of The Round Table, the informal gathering of wits who for years graced the main table of Frank Case's Algonquin Hotel no less than they graced American letters. Franklin P. Adams, Robert Benchley, Tallulah Bankhead, Marc Connelly, Edna Ferber, Robert Sherwood were some of the regular members, and Frank Case's daughter, a gifted writer herself, does them full honor. *The Vicious Circle* is one of the maddest, most delightful books in many a year.—O. C. S.

was paid in Washington to the Belling-Martin warnings of March 1941 that the daily air patrols called for in official plans could not be carried out on account of shortages of long-range aircraft. (7) The forces at hand in Hawaii were not deployed effectively in the light of repeated warnings and Army doctrine. (8) Too much was being decided at long range by the staff in Washington without inspection visits. (9) Most important of all, our strategic planners failed to see that a crippling raid on the fleet could be regarded as a necessary preliminary to any major Japanese campaign in the Pacific. No one can quarrel with these conclusions.

Had all the information in our hands been properly evaluated, more adequate defenses at Oahu would have been built up at the risk of weakening other areas, and a 360-degree air patrol would have been established even if four-engine bombers had to be diverted from the Philippines where they served no useful purpose anyway. General Short would never have been permitted to believe that his principal function in December 1941 was to prevent sabotage. If access to "Magic" had not been restricted to two officers on his staff in addition to General Marshall, the importance of the famous "one o'clock message of December 7th" would have been realized at an earlier hour and an additional warning message might have reached General Short prior to the Japanese attack.

This volume will be studied in staff colleges and by students of military affairs for years to come. It illustrates, perhaps as no other book could, the difficulties and obstacles encountered in the American democracy in any effort to work out a sound military program in advance of the outbreak of a war.—LT. COL. H. A. DEWEERD.

What Titoism Means

TITO AND GOLIATH. By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. The Macmillan Company; 312 Pages; Index; \$3.50.

Marshal Tito's split with Stalin in 1948 not only caused a serious political upheaval in the "Communist family of nations" but—all-important at this critical time—it shifted the second largest army in Europe from the Soviet to the Western Allied camp. In accomplishing this about-face, the Yugoslav dictator has not only lent new hope for an early practical defense plan in Europe, but has altered the balance of power in such a way as to discourage a rash Soviet campaign on the Continent.

This is one of the many conclusions that might be drawn from the careful study of Yugoslavia's break with Russia by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of *Foreign Affairs* and long an observer of

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
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
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Balkan politics. His well-documented book concentrates on the political aspects of Tito's policy—vital in the long view—but it does not neglect the immediate military contribution of Yugoslavia as a *de facto* ally of the United States.

The picture at a glance is not very encouraging, for even Tito's considerable military support would hardly enable the West to repel a Soviet attack in the following few months. Without discounting the importance of a million Yugoslav troops which could be in the field almost at first call, it is more heartening at this time to consider how Yugoslavia's strategic importance might serve to discourage Russia from starting a war.

Armstrong estimates that Yugoslavia has under arms between 30 and 35 highly trained divisions of approximately 10,000 men each. Various other units bring the total of immediate effectives to about 500,000, and trained reserves—including many with combat experience—add another 750,000. Thus, assuming an opportunity for full mobilization, it might be said that an army of 1,250,000 has been subtracted from Russia's military power and added to that of the West. Lack of equipment and other considerations, however, would limit the use of these forces on the offensive, and their greatest value at the moment is their weight in the peacetime balance of power.

Before Tito's disaffection, Stalin might have engineered a successful campaign in Europe using only satellite troops, including the Yugoslav army. Today, in Armstrong's opinion, this would probably be impossible. Any European adventure today almost surely would require the use of Russian troops from the outset. Yugoslavia's army is possibly superior to the combination of satellite armies which could be used against it—those of Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Hungary, totaling between 430,000 and 535,000 troops—and in any case it appears strong enough to beat off a purely satellite invasion. "If Stalin wishes to overthrow Tito by force," Armstrong concludes, "he must sooner or later attack him with his own troops, which is another way of saying that he would have decided to run the most serious risk of starting another world war."

On the other hand, he points out that Tito would probably have to fight for his own survival if Russia attacked the West, for he would know there would be no escape after the Allies were beaten. This means that Russia would have to divert part of her strength to contain the Yugoslavs, and the forces involved might be considerable. Even after the Yugoslav army was beaten by Germany in 1941, guerrilla fighters continued the war for three years and alone tied up as many as twenty Nazi divisions.

The sum of this argument is that, at the very least, Russia cannot be expected to promote another successful puppet war in Yugoslavia as in Korea.

But Tito's value to the West doesn't end here. The swing away from Russia has removed a threat to Italy's flank both on the Adriatic Sea and at Trieste, and has provided armed security in its place. Even more important, Russia's sea bases in Albania are cut off from land approach, since that satellite is bordered on two sides by Yugoslavia and on the third by non-Communist Greece. If these submarine bases can be completely neutralized—as they may—Soviet sea power would be bottled up behind the Dardanelles once again. Tito also has deprived Russia of its access to air bases on the Adriatic. This means American strategic air power could operate from Italian instead of North African bases and Soviet planes would have to use fields far to the north or east of their former positions.

Unfortunately, Yugoslavia's well trained army is handicapped by a lack of armor and planes and of replacement parts for its Russian-made equipment. Furthermore, the poor agricultural country has little industry to back up its war machine. These factors, added to the Serbian tradition of defensive guerrilla fighting and the country's long and vulnerable border, make it unlikely that Tito could safely carry an offensive far into enemy territory.

Just how Tito may have affected any plan of conquest by Stalin is unknown, of course, but the results of the bitter political battle between the two Communist leaders is clearly evident. Armstrong makes it plain that the Yugoslav dictator is far ahead in the propaganda and ideological war. As a result of Tito's campaigns, top Communists in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania have been purged. But the signs of nationalist movements within the Communist parties of these satellites persist. The slow progress in collectivization—a cornerstone of Stalinist policy—alone offers ample evidence of subtle sabotage.

Nor has that been all. Tito can be credited with causing even more open and serious splits in the Communist parties of the Western countries. The Norwegian party has been cut down the middle by the schism, and similar conflicts have divided the parties in Austria, France, Belgium and Italy. In this way Tito not only has reduced the opposition to the harried governments in the West—he has demonstrated a weakness in the whole Communist structure as organized by Russia which might in time cut the Goliath of the East down to manageable size.—BROOKS McCLEURE.

Major Amphibious History

THE U. S. MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE: ITS THEORY AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE PACIFIC. By Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl. Princeton University Press. 636 Pages; Photographs; Maps; References; Index; \$7.50.

This book deserves a multi-gun salute. It is scholarly, sound and exhaustive. Almost as exhaustive as a talkative specialist on a four-hour train trip—600 pages of text devoted to one type of warfare is likely to be that.

The Marines adopted amphibious operations as their specialty partly because it was a logical mission and partly because neither the Navy nor the Army could give it any more attention than they could to other types of operations which their missions require them to perform. While the Marines were perfecting their doctrines of amphibious warfare which they first published under the title of *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* in 1934, the Army was perfecting and publishing a whole library of similar manuals.

The doctrines the Marines evolved, as this book proves, stood up in World War II, and such changes as were made during the war were the result of developing techniques and new equipment rather than alterations in the basic doctrine.

Full blown studies of each of the larger amphibious operations in the Pacific, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, make up the big part of the book. They are operational histories only in the sense that the operations are described in terms of how the Marines' amphibious doctrines stood up under the stress of combat.

And the Army, it should certainly be said, gets a fair shake. The criticism is judicious and restrained, and the Marines and the Navy get as much of it as the Army. There are several pages of interesting comparison between Army and Marine methods in the Marshall Islands campaign. What the comparison reveals cannot be stated in any one-sentence summary. The Army performed brilliantly, even better, perhaps, than the Marines, but the question of whether the by-passing tactics of the Marines was superior to the slower, more thorough tactics of the Army isn't answered satisfactorily, as probably it can't be.

The unfortunate command difficulties on Saipan are treated dispassionately. The conclusion seems to be that the 27th Division wasn't as aggressive as it might have been and that the corps' command and staff weren't all they might have been either. Even the Marines, the authors write, criticized the corps' repeated failure for not taking "into sufficient account factors of time and space when handing down orders," and for not being aware

of what was actually happening in the front lines.

From inception this book had the official approval of the Navy Department and the Marine Corps. The authors worked with a study and research group of professors and Marine Corps officers. While the book had official blessing, the authors insist that the interpretations and conclusions are their own and not officially inspired. You need not read very far in it to realize that this is true.

The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War is a valuable book. It is even worth the \$7.50 charged for it though only the deep student of warfare is likely to think so. (The lesson has not registered yet with publishers that after decades of serious military books of several hundred pages, selling at \$3.50 to \$5.00, the man in uniform simply cannot see adding to his library at \$7.50 and more per volume. In any bookstore he can see books of 900 pages selling for \$2.50—reprints, it is true; but no publisher has provided an explanation that makes sense to the consumer of the five- to seven-dollar spread between good books of the same size.)

Similar studies of other types of operations—infantry-artillery teamwork or the infantry-artillery-armor team—would be just as valuable, perhaps more so. Unfortunately they are unlikely to appear.—J. B. S.

Sound Help and Advice

THE AIR FORCE WIFE. By Nancy Shea. Harper & Brothers. 362 Pages; Index; \$3.00.

The Air Force came into its own with the unification of the Armed Forces. Without doubt, conscious efforts are being made to preserve the best of the old traditions from its Army heritage as well as to encourage new ones. Many traditions can best be nourished in the service home and are the direct responsibility of the service wife. Nancy Shea's most recent book, *The Air Force Wife* is, therefore, a timely and welcome addition to the library of any Air Force home.

The author's long and varied experience as an Air Force wife makes her an able counselor for wives new to the service. From engagement party to funeral service; from trailer camp to foreign embassy; from baby formula to formal dinner; Mrs. Shea has given sympathetic, straightforward, and useful advice.

While her lively and humorous style makes for pleasurable reading, the topical arrangement of the subject matter will encourage the use of the book as a ready reference. The well selected bibliography enhances its usefulness.

If to the older wives, the author sometimes seems condescending in her detail, it must be remembered that the book will be most helpful to young brides new in the Air Force life.—Mrs. MARJORIE RONKA.

Standard and Readable

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY. By Major E. W. Sheppard. The Macmillan Company. 505 Pages; Index; Maps; \$6.00.

This is the fourth edition of a book first published in 1926, and by now considered a standard work in England. The present edition, printed in England and imported by Macmillan, brings the book up to date with a summary of the British Army's part in World War II. Physically, the book disgraces its contents; the paper is of very poor quality, the binding is less than adequate, and the relatively few maps show little detail.

The writing, however, is something else. The British Army has been fighting for a long time—since 55 B.C. as Sheppard has it—and has been rather fully employed during the period, but the author covers its wars in 480 pages of text without leaving the reader breathless. Along with the straight history we get some evaluation and comment, plus a carefully selected reading list with comments, at the end of most chapters. Major Sheppard indulges, too, in the British talent for sane criticism of his country's military mistakes. This self-criticism is something almost unheard of in American military writing, official and unofficial. Our own cover-up on mistakes is almost pathological in contrast.

The British Army's wars in which we have the most interest are of course our own Revolutionary War and the two World Wars. Sheppard's interpretation of the Revolutionary War is rather close to our own in most respects, although he indicates that it was more or less a side-show for the British while they had more important things on their minds. The American reader who believes firmly that the United States Army won the first World War is due for a rude shock when he reads that portion of the history. American troops are mentioned, but very seldom, and their contribution is not given much weight.

Our Anglophobes will be disappointed in Major Sheppard's history and interpretation of World War II because they will find little to criticize. Our contributions in Africa and Burma are given much less weight than we have been led to believe these efforts warranted—but could the author be right? On the other hand, even the most vigorous waver of the Stars and Stripes could not quarrel much with the author's assessment of our fighting in Europe and the Pacific. Our Ninth Army, particularly, comes in for much praise.

The last chapter, an evaluation of the British soldier, the British officer, and the British general through history, is an example of military writing as delightful as one will find in many a foot of library shelves.—A. S.

If It Flies, It's Here

JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT, 1950-1951. Compiled and edited by Leonard Bridgman. McGraw-Hill Book Company. 550 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$20.00.

This is the forty-first edition of this famous compilation of aircraft data. As can be well imagined, this issue is bigger and more comprehensive than its predecessors and maintains *Jane's* position as the most complete, authoritative and accurate work in its field.

In this volume, the complete technical data on the civil and military aircraft of 62 nations of the world have been catalogued in five sections: Part A, Military Aviation; Part B, Civil Aviation; Part C, All the World's Aeroplanes; Part D, Engines; and Part E, All the World's Airships. The arrangement of each section in alphabetical order of nations facilitates its usefulness as a ready reference book.

Photographs, drawings and complete technical specifications augment the general descriptive material. As a matter of fact, there isn't much about aircraft that isn't in here except how to fly them. Even the advertisements that grace the end pages are attractive.

The aircraft of the United States, Great Britain and the other free countries of the world are given very complete coverage. There is quite a lot of material on the aircraft of the Soviet Union and its satellites but the editors claim to have limited this material to what could be checked for accuracy.

This 8½" x 13" volume, just over an inch thick, is scarcely recommended bedtime reading but if you want all the right information on aircraft where else could you go?—R. F. C.

Our First Great Fight

APPEAL TO ARMS: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By Willard M. Wallace. Harper & Brothers. 308 Pages; Notes; Index; \$4.50.

The American Revolution quite naturally occupies a soft warm spot in the heart of every American. The mere mention of our fight for freedom immediately draws to mind the picture of Paul Revere galloping through every Middlesex village and farm, or George Washington standing proudly in the prow of his boat as his stalwart men struggle to row him across the ice-laden Delaware. The American Revolution spells out the word freedom to most Americans and our history courses throughout our school years do little to dispel its glamor. And yet, with all of this, most of us manage to get through life without knowing much about the purely military aspects of the revolution or what it was really like as a shooting war.

Willard Wallace has done a fine job of overcoming this lack with the publication of this excellent one-volume military history of our revolution. *Appeal to Arms* compares very favorably with a similar work which Fletcher Pratt did on the Civil War in his *Ordeal by Fire*.

Actually when you get into the purely military aspects of the revolution, stripped of all the glamor and fiction that has grown up around it, you are frightened to realize how many times we came so close to losing our fight for independence. The picture could easily have been altered to find George Washington dangling from a hangman's noose as a traitor rather than becoming the first President of our country. Or, except for fate and good luck, we might all be living under a socialist regime, with no Marshall Plan respite available.

Probably no other war has been so badly generalised and at the same time more bitterly fought than the Revolution. Far more time and energy were spent by the leaders of both sides in petty recriminations, political machinations and sheer bull-headedness than were ever applied to doing their jobs. Fortunately, no other military experience in our history has ever been so fraught with traitors, incompetents and lack of governmental support as was our first war.

It's not all grim, though. The author shows well the growth of Washington as a man and military leader. Despite his shortcomings—and he had them—Washington grew mightily in stature during the war years. Then too, the story of "Baron" von Steuben and the contribution he made is one of the most warming parts of this book. I wonder how many of us appreciate all that he did? We can use leaders of his caliber in every generation.

Wallace's examination of the military aspects of the revolution makes good reading, for while it is adequate from a military point of view, he has written for the general reader. Furthermore, *Appeal to Arms* straightens out a lot of misconceptions and mistaken ideas.

The American Revolution was loaded with all the essentials for an excellent novel and even when reported factually it reads like the best in fiction. The cause of freedom will always be exciting to America—and after all, that's the meat of this history. *Appeal to Arms* should enjoy a long and useful life. It's a good military history but even more important it's downright enjoyable reading.—R. F. C.

"There Was No Finer"

BIOGRAPHY OF A BATTALION. By James A. Huston. The Courier Press, Gering, Nebraska. 306 Pages; Photographs; Maps; Bibliography: \$5.00.

The Battalion was the 3d Battalion, 134th Infantry, 35th Infantry Division,

originally a Nebraska outfit manned by National Guardsmen from Omaha, Lincoln and Seward (pop. 2,826). But it could have been the 3d Battalion, 117th Infantry, 30th Division (Tennessee) or the 3d Battalion, 104th Infantry, 26th Division (Massachusetts). That this is so speaks highly of the military efficiency of the American Army but it doesn't mean that the 3d Battalion, 134th Infantry, didn't have a personality of its own, just as each of the several hundred American Infantry battalions did that fought in Europe in World War II. It had its "Bloody Sunday" (30 July) in the battle for St. Lô; its "Blue Monday" (13 Nov.) on "Blood and Guts Hill" in the advance on the Saar. Its greatest thrill was the liberation of Nancy (15 September).

No major campaign in the European Theater escaped it. The Battalion was committed to battle on 16 July 1944 in the vicinity of Emelie, before St. Lô. Nine months later, on 26 April 1945 it pulled out of the lines along the Elbe River. It had suffered 2,900 casualties—and a turnover of 347 per cent. It had mourned the deaths of 346 of its members. It had had four different commanders, each wounded one or more times. Its Company I was the hard-luck outfit; the cost of casualty insurance on its officers would have been prohibitive.

One of its members writing home at war's end had this to say about the Battalion:

"What a long way we have come since the early days in Normandy around St. Lô.

"Looking back, there are three or four actions which stand out as being the really rough ones—almost beyond imagination in severity. These would be (1) St. Lô, (2) Mortain (this did not last so many days), (3) the push through the Saar; Chambrey to Morhange to Sarreguemines to Habkirchen, Germany, (4) the "Bulge" around Luttrebois and Bastogne. By comparison, the rest has seemed easy. Yes, there were always boys getting hurt—worse; there were some sharp battles east of Nancy, and some nerve-wracking close shaves in the Rhineland and in the Ruhr, but it was a different war from those four mentioned.

"The greatest thrill: liberation of Nancy.

"The worst night: the incessant mortar and artillery fire as we waited our turn to follow the 2d Bn. across the Moselle River—they never made it.

"The worst artillery: one day in the woods above Habkirchen (including some of our own tank fire, and that was terrific).

"The toughest nuts to crack: (1) Habkirchen, (2) Luttrebois.

"The worst days for the battalion: "Bloody Sunday," July 30, 1944 and "Blue Monday" on "Blood and Guts Hill," November 13th.

"Best performances of the battalion:

"(1) Chasing the Krauts into St. Lô on July 17th.

"(2) Crossing the Moselle at Nancy.

"(3) Capture of Pan de Sucre Hill (Sugar Loaf)."

Possibly there are unit histories superior to this one. This reviewer has not read many of them and further he admits a sentimental interest in this outfit for he was once a member of the regiment (not the Battalion) and some of the names (Greenleaf, Wood, McDannel, Godwin) are familiar to him. But in fairness he must add that excellent as this history is it has faults. Mr. Huston was a member of the Battalion and he is also a historian. He has written well as a historian and as a soldier. He has also attempted to write as a sociologist. Unfortunately these efforts result in a hodge-podge in some chapters. What Mr. Huston needed was a knowing, sympathetic editor, who could have made suggestions, pointed out rambling discourses that didn't carry along the story of the Battalion, and sharpen up unfortunate sentence constructions and transition paragraphs.

But all of this is minor. The 3d Battalion, 134th Infantry has its World War II history down in a book that lives up to what the author says of the Battalion: "that among infantry battalions there was no finer."—J. B. S.

The Red Cross Story

THE AMERICAN RED CROSS: A HISTORY. By Foster Rhea Dulles. Harper & Brothers. 554 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

Even 265,000 words merely scratch the surface of the requirements for a history of an organization as old, as large, and as busy as the American Red Cross. By the very nature of the organization, few members of the public realize the scope of Red Cross activities. To some it means doughnuts not far behind the lines, to others beans and fatback in time of dust storms, to others the corpulent Gray Ladies who whisk through hospitals. To most of us though, the Red Cross means appeals for funds and blood. In its time, and even now, the Red Cross has been the target of much criticism both from the informed and the uninformed. It is interesting, however, to note that although this great organization has been condemned for snobbery, taking sides on political issues, and many other counts, rarely has it been accused of waste of the funds entrusted to it.

Dr. Dulles, Professor of American History at Ohio State University, had the help of the Red Cross in accumulating the data for this book. Despite this and the additional factor that the manuscript was read and approved by many high Red Cross officials, there seems to be no attempt to soft-pedal the accounts of the mistakes and the criticisms—it reads objectively, although die-hard critics

of the Red Cross may disagree. The book balances well between the matters of high policy and the little human-interest items that illustrate the Red Cross story on the lower levels.—A. S.

Infectious Gusto

PREBLE'S BOYS. By Fletcher Pratt. William Sloane Associates. 419 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00.

Fletcher Pratt obviously enjoyed writing this book. His enthusiasm stands out on every page, as do the gusto and relish with which he tells his story. You'll enjoy reading it, for Pratt's delight in his subject is infectious.

It has become the fashion to extol Pratt's writing ability but to decry his facts. Ponderous-writing historians have made a game of fly-specking Pratt's lively books for historical inaccuracies. Long ago this reviewer learned to accept Pratt's writings as one hundred per cent readable, if only ninety per cent accurate, and to turn to the stuffy historians for the minor facts. Pratt writes a swift-paced narrative, his sharp eye for entrancing detail and his bold summaries of time and events hold your attention.

His latest book deals with the naval side of the War of 1812 (an infinitely more pleasing prospect than that presented by the ground forces). Preble's "boys" are the commanders whom Commodore Preble trained in the philosophy of combat and the tactics of victory: Hull, Decatur, Porter, Bainbridge, Burrows, Biddle and the others who, with their ships *Constitution*, *Essex*, *Wasp*, *Philadelphia*, *United States*, *President* and the rest, were the architects of the modern American Navy.

Their stories are inspiring, and Pratt tells them with a fine vigor. His battle charts are clear and the indexes most useful. Pratt rates a hearty "well done" for this book.—R. G. McC.

Saipan

SAIPAN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END. By Carl W. Hoffman, USMC. Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. 286 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Appendices.

The chief value of this series of Marine Corps monographs on their operations in World War II is the analysis of the lessons to be learned from the operations they describe. Too often combat histories leave it to the reader to form his own conclusions—which is fine if the reader is capable of forming them. Too often, however, the sheer mass of material, as in some of the gigantic Army histories, calls for a trained bird dog to track the facts down and pull a conclusion from the forest of details.

The final chapter in this history of Saipan sums up briefly the lessons learned about: naval gunfire (conspicuous aid); air support (more reliable from direct-

support groups than from carrier planes); artillery (needs strong, central control); landing vehicles (eminently satisfactory); tanks (vital and often decisive factor); engineers (inextricably tied to infantry); signals (SCR-536 useless); logistics (10 units of fire not too much); medical (earned esteem and gratitude).

One important fact is emphasized about Japanese tactics: commanders who doubted the wisdom of an operation did not cancel it; they merely cut down the number of troops committed, and thus foredoomed it to almost certain failure.

The narrative portion of the book covers the events, directives, training and rehearsals leading up to D-day on 15 June 1944, and the whole of the operations until 13 July when the island was officially "secured." After the capture, two battles continued. The first was the grim mopping up that took months. The second was the battle of Smith vs Smith.

Major Hoffman devotes no more to the second battle than is necessary to explain how Major General Ralph Smith came to be relieved. As a Marine, the author is probably entitled to the one editorial comment he makes: "Though five Army generals were relieved in the Pacific Theater during the war, only in this one instance, in which a Marine officer was the initiating agent, were there any non-operational consequences."

This is a highly satisfactory book; well written, well illustrated, well documented, and well designed.—R. G. McC.

Valuable Annual

BRASSEY'S ANNUAL: THE ARMED FORCES YEAR BOOK 1950. By Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield. The Macmillan Company. 584 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$7.00.

This sixty-first annual edition of the invaluable *Brassey's* conforms to modern practice by dropping the "naval" from the title and covering the three services. By so doing it has vastly increased its value as a military reference. In fact it now becomes so useful a reference on the British services that the lack of an American counterpart becomes even more conspicuous by its absence. The recently issued *Army Almanac* largely contains historical information, but even at that it is the first real reference book issued by any of the services. It does not, however, begin to rival *Brassey's* in scope.

The first edition of the new *Brassey's* is largely a success. The first part contains think-pieces and technical articles of general interest. Liddell Hart is provocative as always in a discussion of "Battle or Indirect Action," and Jules Menken analyzes "Statesmen and Fighting Men: The Central Direction of War."

The naval section reviews the world's navies, and discusses carriers and submarines. The army section sets forth the

historical background, general policy and tasks of the army. In view of the current fuss over drafting 18-year-olds it is interesting to note that the British Army accepts boys of 15 and sends them to school for three years, either for technical or line training. A student must serve for eight years after graduating into the army at 18.

A review of British Army equipment and of foreign armies is included. The air section contains the same general information.

The reference section reprints statistics on military expenditures and various policy statements covering the three services.

This is a particularly useful edition of *Brassey's*.—R. G. McC.

Brief Reviews

ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE HYDROGEN BOMB. By Gerald Dendt. Medill McBride Company. 192 Pages; Illustrated; Glossary-Index; \$2.75.

LET'S JOIN THE HUMAN RACE. By Stringfellow Barr. The University of Chicago Press. 30 Pages; \$25. A pamphlet criticizing the Marshall Plan and like programs.

WORLD GEOGRAPHY OF PETROLEUM. Edited by Wallace E. Pratt and Dorothy Good. Published for the American Geographical Society by Princeton University Press. 464 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$7.50.

GUNS, SHELLS AND ROCKETS: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO BALLISTICS. By Major J. C. S. Hymans. Gale & Polden. 106 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$1.00. "The object of this book is to describe simply and comprehensively how various weapons work."

SOOCHOW THE MARINE. By Reginald Owen and Paul Lees. Putnam & Company. 218 Pages; \$2.50. The story of the Fourth Marine Regiment's Chinese canine mascot.

THE FAR LANDS. By James Norman Hall. Little, Brown & Company. 325 Pages; \$3.00.

AN OUTLINE OF SCIENTIFIC CRIMINOLOGY. By Nigel Morland. Philosophical Library. 288 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.25.


CONFESSIONS OF A CHINA HAND. By Ronald Farquharson. William Morrow & Company. 212 Pages; \$3.00.

HOW TO BUILD GARDEN STRUCTURES. By Henry B. Aul. Sheridan House. 384 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50.

A CHILD'S GARDEN OF RELATIVES. By Seymour Barnard; Illustrated by Edna Eicke. Rinehart & Company. 84 Pages; \$2.00.

YOUNG COMMUNISTS IN THE USSR. Translated by Virginia Rhine. Public Affairs Press. 92 Pages. \$2.00. "A Soviet monograph describing the demands made upon members of the Komsomol organization."

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WAR AND THE MINDS OF MEN. By Frederick S. Dunn. Harper & Brothers. 115 Pages; Index; \$2.00. An examination of UNESCO and its position and usefulness today.

INDUSTRIAL AND SAFETY PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. Edited by Morris H. Shamos and Sidney G. Roth. Harper & Brothers. 368 Pages; Illustrated; \$4.00. "Designed for the intelligent layman rather than the technical expert," specifically concerned with non-military uses of atomic energy.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY. Department of State. 101 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$.25.

THE SAVANNAH. By Thomas L. Stokes. Illustrated by Lamar Dodd. Rhinehart & Company. 401 Pages; Index; \$4.00. One more of a famous series—this time about a really romantic and glamorous river.

THE PRODIGAL CENTURY. By Henry Pratt Fairchild. Philosophical Library. 258 Pages; Index; \$3.75.

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. By Douglas L. Oliver. Harvard University Press. 313 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. A broad history in a few pages.

THE LETTERS OF ROBERT G. INGERSOLL. Collected and edited by Eva Ingersoll Wakefield. Philosophical Library. 747 Pages; Index; \$7.50.

PLANNING MICRONESIA'S FUTURE. Edited by Douglas L. Oliver. Harvard University Press. 94 Pages; \$3.50. A 94-page paper backed pamphlet.

CAROLINE HICKS. By Walter Karig. Rhinehart & Company. 438 Pages; \$3.50. Fiction—the story of a Government girl.

THE REEF. By Keith Wheeler. E. P. Dutton & Company. 320 Pages; \$3.00. Psychological novel of an ex-Marine with a guilt complex and his return to postwar Tarawa.

ANGEL OF GAIETY. By Joseph Hittrec. Harper & Brothers. 246 Pages; \$3.00. A new novel of India by the author of *Son of the Moon*.

THE NINETEEN FIFTIES COME FIRST. By Edwin C. Nourse. Henry Holt & Company. 184 Pages; \$2.00. A forceful exposition of the economic views of Dr. Nourse, formerly Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors to the President.

THE CARAVAN PASSES. By George Tabori. Appleton-Century-Crofts. 304 Pages; \$3.00. A novel of the Middle East, with attendant sin and intrigue.

THE ARMS OF VENUS. By John Appleby. Coward-McCann. 215 Pages; \$2.75. A suspense novel with a Greek setting.

THE FORM DIVINE. By Hildegard Dolson. Random House. 310 Pages; \$3.00. The author quietly takes apart the beauty salon, or "new woman" trade.

THE MAN WHO KNEW THE DATE. By Sophie Kerr. Rhinehart & Company. 248 Pages; \$2.50. A novel of a man with a strange power—he could look at his friends and tell when they were going to die.

THE RIDDLE OF MACARTHUR: JAPAN, KOREA AND THE FAR EAST. By John Gunther. Harper & Brothers. 240 Pages; Index; \$2.75. A study of General MacArthur and his work in the Far East, by one of our best known reporters.

BASEBALL TECHNIQUES ILLUSTRATED. By Ethan Allen and Tyler Micleau. A. S. Barnes & Company. 96 Pages; Illustrated; \$1.50.

CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. By Vladimir Nabokov. Harper & Brothers. 240 Pages; \$3.00. An autobiographical memoir by one of our foremost novelists.

SUBSTANCE OF A DREAM. By Garth Hale. E. P. Dutton & Company. 315 Pages; \$3.00. A novel of family life.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917-1923. By Edward Hallett Carr. The Macmillan Company. 430 Pages; \$5.00. Volume I of a history of Soviet Russia beginning with the October Revolution of 1917, by a distinguished historian.

THORNDIKE-BARNHART COMPREHENSIVE DESK DICTIONARY. Edited by Clarence L. Barnhart. Doubleday & Company. 896 Pages; Regular Edition, \$2.75; Thumb-Indexed, \$3.25; Flexible de luxe, indexed, \$3.75. A new medium priced dictionary edited by the editor of the *American College Dictionary*.

STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF "THE AMERICAN SOLDIER." Edited by Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. The Free Press. 255 Pages; Index; \$3.50.

PELELIU. By Major Frank O. Hough, USMCR. Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. 209 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; \$2.50. Another in the growing series of official Marine histories. Paper bound.

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
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